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Corporate Torts: International Human Rights and 
Superior Officers 
Jennifer M. Green 
Abstract 
 
Recent decisions by U.S. courts have attacked the ability of human rights victims to hold 
corporations accountable for their complicity in atrocities around the world. This Article argues 
that in the face of this attack, advocates and scholars have given insufficient attention to a potent 
strategy—holding corporate officers liable. It examines the corporate officer liability question 
through the lens of tort liability, focusing on those officers with superior responsibility over their 
subordinates who physically commit the violations. It is the first to provide a systematic analysis 
of how superior officer liability under tort and international law approaches to superior 
responsibility and criminal liability might provide a basis for greater accountability for corporate 
officers. This Article examines the historical origins of military and state civilian command 
responsibility, the trials of civilian corporate officials in Nuremberg and Tokyo jurisprudence 
following World War II, the special international and hybrid criminal tribunals first established 
in the 1990s, and tort cases in the U.S. and other jurisdictions. In so doing, this Article 
complements important parallel efforts to hold corporations liable. This Article considers options 
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for officer liability in situations when governments cannot or will not bring criminal charges, or 
when bringing claims against the officer may be the most efficient means of changing corporate 
behavior. It concludes that human rights law, international criminal law, and domestic tort and 
related liability standards all provide liability for corporate officers under a theory of superior 
responsibility for human rights violations. This common core standard provides an important tool 
for compensating victims of past abuses and deterring ongoing or future human rights violations. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Corporate accountability for human rights violations is at a critical juncture. 
Over the past two decades there have been allegations about the role of 
multinational corporations in forced labor in Burma, attacks on human rights 
activists and nonconsensual drug trials on children in Nigeria, and complicity with 
security forces in killings and torture in Indonesia, to name a few examples.1 
Globalization has expanded the economic power of multinational corporations, 
which has increased concerns about the lack of mechanisms to hold them 
accountable. Repeated efforts to strengthen international law protections against 
corporate human rights violations since at least the 1970s have faced multiple 
roadblocks. Notable examples are the 2012 and 2013 rulings by the U.S. Supreme 
Court which imposed limitations on two of the most crucial laws used by victims 
to access U.S. courts;2 the Court limited the extraterritorial application of the Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS)3 and prohibited all lawsuits against corporations under the 
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).4 This trend of increasing obstacles to 
human rights victims is also apparent in other national and international 
jurisdictions.5 
This Article argues that the search for a means to protect against corporate 
abuses has given insufficient attention to an important aspect of a robust legal 
framework for accountability: holding corporate officers liable for their role in 
human rights violations when they had a direct role such as ordering a subordinate 
to commit a violation or an indirect role. The latter “indirect” or omission form 
of superior responsibility includes when a superior (1) had “effective control” over 
the lower-ranking person who physically committed the act, (2) in various 
permutations, that the superior knew or had reason to know about the violation(s), 
and (3) failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the act or 
                                                 
1  See Jennifer M. Green, The Rule of Law at a Crossroad: Enforcing Corporate Responsibility in International 
Investment Through the Alien Tort Statute, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1085, 1089–90, 1092 (2014). 
2  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (limiting permissible Alien 
Tort claims to claims that “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient 
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”); Mohamad v. Palestinian 
Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 (2012) (limiting Torture Victim Protection Act defendants to natural 
persons). 
3  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided, “[t]he district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”); Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1659. 
4  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (provision signed 
into law in 1992 allowing foreign and U.S. citizen plaintiffs to sue for torture and summary 
execution) [hereinafter TVPA]; Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1702. 
5   See, for example, infra at notes 32–39 and accompanying text. 
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punish the perpetrator.6 While direct responsibility is mentioned as part of the 
discussion of the historical development of standards, the focus of this Article is 
on the second, more contested form of liability. Holding corporate supervisors 
accountable can play an important role in providing compensation for victims and 
punishing violators.7 An effective system may also deter future violations. Yet 
despite significant scholarship on corporate human rights abuses, there has been 
surprisingly little attention paid to the liability of corporate officers who are 
complicit in human rights violations. This Article seeks to address that gap by 
examining a long-neglected, traditional form of individual tort liability: superior 
responsibility.8 
Most scholarship on superior responsibility for human rights abuses has 
focused on military standards and international criminal prosecutions rather than 
on civil liability.9 The more limited scholarship on the duty of care has largely 
concentrated on fiduciary duties to the corporation and shareholders rather than 
the duty to third parties such as victims of human rights abuses.10 However, this 
focus has begun to shift, with human rights advocates and scholars now arguing 
for a duty of care to be applied to corporations themselves with regard to human 
rights violations.11 An important complement to these efforts is liability for 
individual officers. 
                                                 
6  See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 122 (2005); 
GUÉNËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 24 (2009). 
7   This Article focuses on corporate officers who make and implement policy on a day-to-day basis 
rather than the board of directors, who are in general more removed; this distance could cause more 
questions about the application of superior responsibility than there is space to address in this 
Article. 
8  Although “command responsibility” is often applied to military commanders, “superior 
responsibility” more commonly encompasses civilian governmental officials and non-governmental 
officials such as corporate officers. Given its focus, this Article will use the term “superior 
responsibility.” 
9 See, for example, Timothy Wu & Jonathan Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates—The 
Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Analogues in United States Law, 38 HARV. INT’L L. J. 272 (1997) 
(addresses criminal responsibility only and limited to U.S. and international jurisprudence as of 
1997); Brian Seth Parker, Applying the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility to Corporate Officers: A Theory of 
Individual Liability for International Human Rights Violations, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 
(2012) (preliminary note written before the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel and focused on 
selected common elements between U.S. federal common law and international criminal law). 
10  See, for example, Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the 
Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631 (2009). 
11  See, for example, Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 
YALE. L. J. 443, 506 (2001) (“[C]ommand responsibility itself seems a justifiable basis for corporate 
duties in situations where corporations are indeed superiors to governmental actors.”); Douglass 
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This Article adds to this emerging area of corporate human rights 
accountability by explaining the importance of, and articulating a consistent 
standard of accountability for, corporate officers under existing international and 
domestic tort law. It surveys multiple sources of international and national law to 
demonstrate that a duty and related tort liability for corporate officers exists under 
the theory of superior responsibility. Under international and domestic law, 
corporate officers can and should be held liable under a superior responsibility 
standard for human rights violations that constitute torts, or as they are known in 
other legal systems, “non-contractual liability” or “delicts.” Despite international 
agreement on the existence of this responsibility, it has been used rarely, resulting 
in the lack of enforcement of the duty to prevent and punish officers for human 
rights abuses committed by their subordinates. This Article makes both a 
conceptual contribution to scholarship on corporate accountability and a practical 
contribution to efforts to address human rights violations. 
This analysis has a number of direct applications to human rights 
enforcement. It is relevant to litigation in U.S. courts under a number of statutes 
that authorize suits in U.S. state courts for common law torts based on conduct 
that violates human rights. In the first U.S case to address superior responsibility 
for corporate officers under the ATS or TVPA, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama held that this form of liability did not apply to 
corporate officers.12 On appeal, the legal ruling was reversed, but the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that there were insufficient facts to link 
the plaintiffs to the defendants and dismissed the allegations.13 These rulings 
highlighted the challenge and the promise of superior responsibility in human 
rights cases in U.S. tort cases. 
The application and potential application of superior officer liability for 
human rights violations extends beyond the ATS and TVPA cases. Survivors have 
brought cases around the world and in multiple jurisdictions in U.S. federal and 
state courts. Related cases in U.S. courts have been brought against corporate 
officers for environmental violations, including charges against Gary Southern of 
Freedom Industries for the 2014 Elk River chemical spill,14 and corporate officers 
                                                 
Cassel, Outlining the Case for a Common Law Duty of Care of Business to Exercise Human Rights Due Diligence 
1 BUS. & HUM. RIGHTS J. 1 (2016); see also AMNESTY INT’L, INJUSTICE INCORPORATED: CORPORATE 
ABUSES AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO REMEDY (2014); Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice, The 
Responsible Business Initiative: Protecting Human Rights and the Environment, https://perma.cc/MZ2T-
MXXU. 
12  See Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873978, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 
25, 2013). 
13  See Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2015). 
14  See Daniel Heyman, Ex-Executive Pleads Guilty in Toxic Spill in West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/us/ex-executive-pleads-guilty-in-toxic-spill-in-
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responsible for the Upper Big Branch mine collapse in which twenty-nine workers 
died.15 In Germany, claims were brought against a senior manager for failure to 
supervise security forces for a subsidiary of a German company, the Danzer 
Group.16 In May 2016, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights noted 
that the “individual liability of corporate officers” is an important aspect of the 
right to remedy human rights victims.17 
By strengthening the framework for accountability, suing corporate officers 
who are in positions of authority will build the body of law to provide remedies 
to human rights victims and deter violations. This Article’s focus on tort law 
complements what has been a greater focus among scholars on criminal law for 
individual corporate officers. Tort law has the benefit of greater openness to 
victims of human rights violations, especially in systems where criminal charges 
must be brought by government prosecutors and political considerations may 
intervene and prevent charges from being brought. In addressing a lack of 
attention to the possibility of the greater use of tort liability for corporate superior 
officers, this Article further complements the tremendous body of scholarship on 
civil and criminal liability for corporations as institutions. 
Section II of this Article offers an introduction to the development and 
attacks of the human rights framework and the relevance of tort and related civil 
damage law doctrines for individual victims. Section III analyzes the historical 
origins of superior responsibility and its application to private actors, including at 
the Nuremberg industrialist trials after the Second World War. Section IV 
examines the renewed judicial focus on the jurisprudence of international criminal 
tribunals, which began in the 1990s. Section V considers how U.S. courts have 
applied superior officer liability in human rights and other tort cases and compares 
these basic principles of superior responsibility for corporate officers to how other 
national legal systems deal with corporate officer liability. Section VI returns to 
the normative question of the value of this type of liability and the complementary 
relationship with corporate institutional accountability. This Article concludes that 
the doctrine of superior responsibility is fully applicable to, and has been applied 
to, corporate officials. While there may be differences in the periphery of legal 
application, there is a common core to the legal standard. This common core 
provides that those who are culpable can be held accountable, but it does not cast 
                                                 
west-virginia.html?_r=0. 
15  See West Virginia Mine Owner Settles with Victims’ Families, CNN (Jan. 12, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/86BG-YR4W. 
16  See Criminal Complaint Accuses Senior Manager of Danzer Group of Responsibility over Human Rights Abuses 
Against Congolese Community, GLOBAL WITNESS (Apr. 24, 2013), https://perma.cc/F6C2-SQLU. 
17  U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy for Victims 
of Business-Related Human Rights Abuse. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/19, at 5, (May 10, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/9BLY-N9GB. 
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a net so widely as to ensnare those who were carrying out legitimate functions. 
The consistency of this inclusion of corporate officials across human rights law, 
international criminal law, and domestic tort law suggests that it could serve as an 
important tool for corporate accountability that complements corporate 
institutional accountability. 
II.  THE NEED TO REVISIT CORPORATE OFFICER 
TORT LIABILITY  
The duty of corporate officers to prevent human rights violations and 
provide remedies to victims are concepts that have strong historical bases both in 
human rights law and in standards developed for corporate responsibility under 
international law. The human rights movement after World War II focused on the 
rights of individuals against violations by government officials and non-state 
actors, affirmed that these rights entail rights to remedies (including civil or tort 
remedies) for violations, and created responsibilities for those in positions of 
authority. 
This Section provides the foundation for the rest of the Article. It addresses 
the historical developments and the underlying importance of holding corporate 
officers accountable as well as the types of acts for which they should be held 
accountable. In doing so, this Section lays out important underlying questions 
explored in this Article: (1) Why focus on corporate officer liability now, and (2) 
What is the relevance of tort liability to superior officer liability? 
A.  The Development of (and Attacks on) the Business and 
Human Rights Framework  
The end of the Second World War produced important breakthroughs in 
the human rights movement. The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals tried military, 
civilian government, and industrialist (corporate) officials and found those in each 
category liable for their actions—and inaction. This inclusion of military and 
civilian state and private officials in the trials held in the occupied zones continued 
into the 1950s, although Cold War politics led to the dismissal of charges against 
the industrialists in the early 1950s.18 
The growing movements for rights included the U.S. Civil Rights 
Movement, and increasing activism around human rights issues including the 
formation of organizations such as Amnesty International in 1961.19 Rights were 
                                                 
18  See Michael Bazyler & Jennifer Green, Nuremberg-Era Jurisprudence Redux: The Supreme Court in Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and the Legal Legacy of Nuremberg, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 23, 59 (2012). 
19  Who We Are, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, https://perma.cc/WJY2-Q23L. 
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increasingly codified with the emergence of a growing number of human rights 
treaties in 196620 and the protocols on humanitarian law in 1977.21 A 
complementary development was the increasing examination of the overlapping 
responsibilities for human rights violations of state and non-state actors, 
prominently in the context of gender rights, which examined and developed 
standards for due diligence in cases of domestic violence.22 
It is against this backdrop of the development of human rights law that the 
role of transnational corporations began to receive additional international 
attention. In 1972, the U.N. Economic and Social Council ordered a study of the 
impact of transnational corporations on the development process and 
international relations.23 In 1979, the U.N. established an advisory body, the 
Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC).24 From 1977–1990, the 
UNCTC developed a code of conduct for multinational corporations, but the final 
draft prepared in 1990 was never adopted.25 Country-specific standards included 
the 1977 Sullivan Principles to address apartheid South Africa26 and the 1984 
MacBride Principles, the code of conduct for U.S. companies doing business in 
Northern Ireland.27 
                                                 
20  As the literature led by Oona Hathaway, Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks, and Beth Simmons has 
pointed out, the development, and even ratification, of a treaty are insufficient for change in human 
rights norms. Moreover, treaty ratification can sometimes be mere window-dressing and a substitute 
for substantive steps to improve human rights standards. However, the process of implementation 
with public scrutiny and the involvement of civil society can be important factors in the 
enforcement of the treaties. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, 111 YALE. L. J. 1935 (2002); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human 
Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2003); Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 273 (2010), https://perma.cc/6SDL-9ERC. 
21  See, for example, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol II].  
22  See generally HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2000). 
23  See U.N. Economic and Social Council Res. 1721 (LIII) (July 28, 1972). 
24  See Karl P. Sauvant, The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations: 
Experience and Lessons Learned, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 11 15–16 (2015). 
25  See Connie De La Vega, Amol Mehra, & Alexandra Wong, Holding Businesses Accountable for Human 
Rights Violations: Recent Developments and Next Steps (July 2, 2011), https://perma.cc/8WAA-SGCC. 
26  See The Global Sullivan Principles, THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY, 
https://perma.cc/JU6X-WGCT. 
27  See Father Sean McManus, The MacBride Principles, THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA HUMAN RIGHTS 
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The focus on actors with the highest levels of responsibility for human rights 
violations was an important development in these multiple movements for greater 
accountability. One underlying theme was that all perpetrators, including 
corporate actors, must be held accountable. Together, these dynamics added to 
the momentum for a universal system of accountability for non-state actors. 
The 1990s also saw an increasing focus on the right of human rights victims 
to remedies for the violations against them. Special international tribunals were 
created to address mass atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, followed 
by the 1998 establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC 
statute, often referred to as the “Rome Statute,” required the establishment of a 
trust fund so that victims of those convicted of human rights violations would 
benefit from the “principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, 
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”28 In 2003, the ICC 
Prosecutor stated that these violations could include corporate officers,29 and in 
September 2016, the ICC issued a policy paper discussing liability of corporate 
officials for environmental crimes.30 
More broadly, in 1989, the U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities began a study on the right to 
restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.31 This study examined violations by 
those with what was labeled more “indirect” responsibility, or who might have 
violated rights by omission rather than commission.32 This ultimately led to a 
Resolution by the U.N. General Assembly which summarized the important steps 
toward an international system to advance the right of victims to remedies, 
                                                 
LIBRARY, https://perma.cc/JA8X-5HCM. 
28  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 75, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002), https://perma.cc/Z3ML-Q9FR [hereinafter Rome 
Statute]. 
29  See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC 4 (2003), 
https://perma.cc/N9YL-36HM (Commenting on the relationship between resource extraction and 
violations in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the former Prosecutor stated, 
“[t]hose who direct mining operations, sell diamonds or gold extracted in these conditions . . . could 
also be authors of the crimes.”). 
30  International Criminal Court, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, https://perma.cc/SDL9-
A7B2. 
31  See Theo van Boven, The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L. 1 (2010), https://perma.cc/7U38-
HQ8F. 
32 See id. at 3. 
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including compensation and restitution.33 
During the same period, the movement to impose transnational norms on 
corporations intensified. In addition to the cases in U.S. courts, cases were 
brought in Australia, England, and France against multinational corporations and 
corporate officers. The U.N. continued to develop standards for businesses and 
their officers. In 2002, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights/Subcommission 
drafted a set of principles to directly bind businesses and endorsed corporate 
officer responsibility.34 The preamble “[r]eaffirm[ed] that transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, their officers—including managers, 
members of corporate boards or directors and other executives—and persons 
working for them have, inter alia, human rights obligations and responsibilities.”35 
However, these standards were met with strong opposition and were stopped at 
the U.N. Commission.36 
In 2005, the U.N. shifted back to a voluntary framework, which in 2011 
resulted in the U.N. Human Rights Council endorsement of the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (“Guiding Principles”).37 The Guiding 
Principles contained three “pillars” on human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises: (1) the state duty to protect, the (2) 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights standards, and (3) the state duty 
to take measures to remedy violations. Significantly, the Guiding Principles 
endorsed private litigation as one appropriate remedy for victims, and rejected 
attacks on these remedies.38 Some businesses began to implement internal 
policies,39 and states began to develop National Action Plans to begin to 
                                                 
33  G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005), https://perma.cc/C49S-5MA3. 
34  Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 
2003). 
35  Id. at 3 (emphasis added); see generally David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 901 (2003). 
36  See supra note 35. 
37  U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Annex to Final Report 
to the Human Rights Council by John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). 
38  Ruggie, Kiobel and Corporate Social Responsibility: An Issues Brief, supra note 37. 
39  See The Foundations for Human Rights Due Diligence, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, 
https://perma.cc/FHA6-5AKK; Introduction, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, 
https://perma.cc/9FLQ-JMKN; Key findings from our empirical research, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, 
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implement the Guiding Principles.40 
Yet, for many, especially those continuing to suffer human rights abuses at 
the hands of multinational corporations, progress has been far too slow. The 
passage of time has also increased fears that voluntary implementation could allow 
too much discretion by corporate officers, and states have become reticent to 
establish limits on corporate activity. This desire for quicker, more binding action 
led some governments and non-governmental organizations to renew calls for a 
binding treaty. In 2014, the Human Rights Council established an international 
working group to begin the drafting process for a treaty on business and human 
rights.41 In July 2015, the working group held its first meeting to begin discussing 
the parameters of a treaty.42 
In the U.S., one step toward accountability for those who violated basic 
human rights has been a line of cases in U.S. courts. These cases were first brought 
under the ATS, a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that allowed tort claims 
that are violations of the “law of nations” or a treaty of the U.S.43 The first case to 
allege international human rights violations under the ATS was brought in 1979 
against a police official who physically tortured a 17-year-old son of a political 
opposition leader to death.44 In the 1980s, defendants included military and 
civilian commanders,45 and in the 1990s, cases were brought against corporations 
and corporate officials.46 However, in 2013, the Supreme Court issued a confusing 
ruling about how and when the ATS applies to acts occurring overseas,47 which 
has imposed an additional hurdle to human rights victims seeking to bring claims 
in U.S. courts.48 In 1992, the Torture Victim Protection Act was signed into law, 
but it was subsequently interpreted to limit defendants to natural persons.49 These 
                                                 
https://perma.cc/8BUH-WPDC. 
40  See Cindy S. Woods, Engaging the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights & the Extractive Sector, 12 BRAZ. J. INT’L L. 571, 572 (2015) 
(“Over thirty countries have committed to creating a NAP, including many within the inter-
American system, signaling the region's readiness to engage with the Guiding Principles.”). 
41  See Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with 
Respect to Human Rights, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/GY7A-JB3R. 
42  See id. 
43  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 877. 
44  See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 877–80 (detailing the background of the case). 
45  BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL HOFFMAN & MICHAEL RATNER, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 12–14 (2d ed. 2008). 
46  See id. at 15 
47  See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
48  See Green, supra note 1, at 1097–1101. 
49  See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1708.  
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two statutes that allow tort remedies have been two of the key statutes allowing 
human rights victims to seek redress in U.S. courts. 
In other countries there have been successful cases establishing or following 
the principle of corporate accountability for human rights violations. In England, 
a recent legislative change allowed foreign direct liability: if the parent company is 
directly involved in the subsidiary’s operation or exercises de facto control over 
those operations, it owes a duty of care to employees and anyone affected by the 
operations.50 Cases in England have resulted in numerous successful verdicts and 
settlements for the plaintiffs,51 as have cases in Australia,52 Argentina,53 
Colombia,54 and Ghana.55 Some countries have laws providing for a forum of 
necessity—plaintiffs may bring the claims in their domestic courts if there is no 
other forum where plaintiffs could reasonably seek relief.56 A growing number of 
countries also allow for the possibility of corporate criminal liability.57 Human 
                                                 
50  Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 1159 (U.K.), https://perma.cc/TE6F-MCUS. 
51  See, for example, Chandler v. Cape PLC, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 (Eng.) (concerning a worker 
exposed to asbestos in an extinct subsidiary company who was able to recover from the parent 
company); Guerrero et al. v. Monterrico Metals PLC, [2010] EWHC 3228 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (concerning 
thirty-three Peruvians protesting a copper mine; the plaintiffs charged corporate complicity in 
torture and the case ended in confidential settlement); Landmark Settlement of Miners’ Claims Boosts 
Fight for Silicosis Compensation, LEIGH DAY (Sept. 25, 2013), https://perma.cc/B3SH-XFWJ 
(discussing a settlement by a mining company to pay South African workers who contracted 
silicosis). 
52  See, for example, BHP Lawsuit (re Papua New Guinea), BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE 
(Feb. 18, 2014), https://perma.cc/V7WJ-2UJ5. Sued in Australia, the mining company BHP was 
required to pay AUS $40 million and remove mine tailings from a polluted river in Papua New 
Guinea. 
53  See, for example, Argentina: Court Halts Open-Pit Uranium Mine, NUCLEAR MONITOR (WISE) (May 12, 
2010), https://perma.cc/DQ5D-6F27; Court Halts Open-Pit Mining in Northern Argentina, LATIN 
AMERICAN HERALD TRIB. (Apr. 24, 2010), https://perma.cc/79UV-NZEL (reporting that the 
Argentinean Supreme Court halted open pit uranium mining until a transnational company could 
show that work would not cause contamination or environmental damage). 
54  See Claudia Müller-Hoff, Making Corporations Respond to the Damage They Cause: Strategic Approaches to 
Compensation and Corporate Accountability, EUROPEAN CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL & HUMAN 
RIGHTS 5, 15 (Jan. 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/ZGX6-LKLE. 
55  See id. at 25 (explaining that the High Court of Ghana granted compensation to victims of forced 
displacement by Anglogold Ashanti at the Iduapriem mine in Ghana). 
56  Mauro Bussani & Marta Infantino, The Many Cultures of Tort Liability, in COMPARATIVE TORT LAW: 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 11 (Mauro Bussani & Anthony J. Sebok eds., 2015) (forum non conveniens 
discussion). 
57  Examples include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, India, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, U.K., and the U.S. See ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. 
THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY 
FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13−27 (2006); Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the 
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rights victims in these countries have also seen pushback on their right to seek 
legal remedies, such as through increased procedural requirements and in 
reductions in legal aid and in court-ordered attorneys’ fees in the U.K.58 
Thus, the historical context for corporate accountability is one in which there 
are many forces in civil society, national and governmental systems, and laws on 
the books for accountability for human rights violations, including violations by 
corporate actors. These factors are important pressures which enhance the 
prospect for imposing civil liability on corporate officers responsible for human 
rights abuses. However, there are also numerous counterweights to these forces 
and laws, and many questions about the need to focus on tort liability for 
corporate officers. 
B.  Human Rights Violations and Tort Liabil ity for 
Corporate Officers 
This Section will introduce the theoretical framework for holding corporate 
officers accountable through tort remedies, or more broadly (to encompass 
variations in different types of legal systems), compensation for particular harms 
to individuals. The Section will also address the relationship of tort remedies to 
the more common framework of jurisprudence on human rights questions, 
namely, humanitarian and international criminal law. 
1. Why tort law? 
On the most basic level, the global human rights movement overlaps with 
straightforward concepts of tort liability—civil responsibility for wrongs one 
person causes another.59 Tort remedies provide an important component in the 
enforcement of international law.60 The starting point for the analysis of the 
relationship between tort remedies and international law is the multi-faceted 
nature of human rights litigation. 
Elsewhere, Sandra Coliver, Paul Hoffman, and I have described the 
overlapping functions of ATS/TVPA litigation in the U.S., in which plaintiffs sue 
physical perpetrators, civilian and military superiors, and corporations and 
corporate officers for violations including genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
                                                 
Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1493–1500 (2009); see also Flomo, 
643 F.3d at 1018–20. 
58  See Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A Comparative 
Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127, 132–34 (2013). 
59  See STEPHENS, CHOMSKY, GREEN, HOFFMAN, & RATNER, supra note 45, at XXV. 
60  See, for example, Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1013; Ruggie, supra note 37; GEORGE P. FLETCHER, TORT 
LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 173–75 (2008). 
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humanity, extrajudicial executions, disappearances, torture, slavery and forced 
labor, and human trafficking.61 The functions of this litigation include holding 
individual perpetrators accountable for human rights abuses, providing victims 
with some sense of official acknowledgment and reparation, contributing to the 
development of international human rights law, building constituency in the U.S. 
supporting application of international law, adding to a climate of deterrence, and 
supporting or catalyzing efforts in other countries for human rights 
enforcement.62 Martha Minow discusses how legal proceedings have promoted 
reconciliation and healing in a conflicted society.63 
Allowing survivors or surviving family members to bring claims can provide 
an opportunity for financial compensation that, while perhaps seeming mundane 
and insufficient to some, does provide an avenue for redress, and an opportunity 
for compensation to help injured people get on with their lives. The court process 
itself offers validation by providing a formal legal judgment. In the case of punitive 
damages, plaintiffs receive the added benefit of a public statement reflecting the 
gravity of what the survivor or their lost family member(s) have suffered. For the 
defendants, court proceedings provide public accountability for what they have 
done, and for those who might be tempted to commit the same categories of 
wrongs, a warning that there may be serious financial and reputational 
consequences for their actions. 
Tort law also provides that there is a duty of reasonable care for one person 
to avoid causing harm to another, and it has a developed jurisprudence on the 
doctrine of reasonable care, foreseeable harm, and due diligence. The purpose of 
providing incentives for appropriate future behavior overlaps with the multiple 
functions of human rights law to contribute to the development of human rights 
norms and the deterrence of future violations.64 Tort theory crosses legal systems 
and is commonly included in statutory or common law around the world.65 In 
other legal systems, victims of abuses seek to both punish the perpetrators of the 
abuse through criminal and civil remedies, and receive compensation, sometimes 
                                                 
61  See generally Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable 
by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 169 (2005). 
62  See generally id. 
63  MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE 
AND MASS VIOLENCE 61 (1998). 
64  See Danner & Martinez, supra note 6, at 777; Leon Gettler, Liability Forges a New Morality, GLOBAL 
POLICY FORUM (Aug. 3, 2005), https://perma.cc/YEK5-WDRN; Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing 
Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive 
Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207 (2008). 
65  PAULA GILIKER, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 5 (2010). 
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through a mechanism linked to their criminal claim.66 For example, in the civil law 
system in France, the criminal system is the dominant system, with individuals 
able to be a partie civile, or civil party, to the criminal action. 
In her analysis of whether there are parallel options for human rights victims 
to the Alien Tort Statute in other countries, Beth Stephens raised the concept of 
“translation” among different legal systems.67 For a concept to be “translated” 
from one system to another does not require identical implementation, but 
adherence to the same underlying concept: “the mechanical transfer of legal 
procedure from one system to another is rarely effective. Instead, common goals 
must be realized through procedures appropriate to each national system.”68 At 
base are the “commonalities.”69 “Victims of human rights abuses around the 
world seek comparable results through varied procedural models, tailored to the 
requirements of their local legal systems.”70 
This Article will explore the common denominator of providing remedies to 
human rights victims in these multiple sources of law. To properly compare and 
translate the concept of superior liability across jurisdictions, it is necessary to 
focus on this common core of parallel tests in international and domestic systems 
rather than the differences in implementation throughout the different systems. 
After examining examples from different systems, I conclude that international 
law standards providing superior responsibility for corporate officers are 
consistent with parallel standards in U.S. law. Common types of actions have 
resulted in common types of liability, the availability of remedies to victims of 
                                                 
66  See Ratner, supra note 11, at 497 (“For instance, certain important U.S. statutes hold private 
defendants civilly and criminally liable for violations of civil rights on the theory that such entities 
may be acting ‘under the color of law’”); Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and 
International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 1, 44–46 (2002) (explaining that the division between the civil and criminal actions should be 
eliminated by states); Robert C. Thompson, Anita Ramasastry, & Mark B. Taylor, Translating Unocal: 
The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 841, 894 (2009) (“In other countries, the need for accountability may translate into 
criminal prosecutions or administrative processes instead of civil litigation, or else into hybrid 
remedies, such as the action civile.”). 
67  See Stephens, supra note 66, at 4. 
68  Id. at 4 (citing Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993)) (constitutional 
interpretation); see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 373 (1988); 
Craig Scott, Translating Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on Corporate 
Accountability for Human Rights Harms, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 45–47 (Craig Scott ed., 2001). 
69  Stephens, supra note 66, at 5. 
70  Id. at 5; Thompson, Ramasastry, & Taylor, supra note 66, at 845. 
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human right violations, and enforcement of standard tort principles of the duty 
of care. 
2. The relationship between tort remedies, international human rights 
law, and international criminal law. 
In a common law system, the widespread understanding of the relationship 
between tort and criminal law is that tort law provides compensation while 
punishment is primarily the role of the criminal system.71 In a system such as the 
U.S. where punitive damages are a possibility this line becomes more blurred 
because the goal of punitive damages is, as the name says, punishment; punitive 
damages also have the purpose of deterring future violations72 and of naming and 
shaming the tortfeasor, which serves both the aims of deterrence and the 
declarative function of law.73 
Another frequent distinction between the criminal and tort systems is that 
crimes are considered committed against society as a whole. In civil law systems, 
these functions are linked when a private party is able to join a criminal action. 
The nature of human rights violations further blurs the classic distinction between 
the criminal and civil systems.74 
Tort and criminal liability have been set against each other—sometimes in 
an attempt to avoid any accountability. In his important opinion finding a legal 
basis for holding corporations liable in a civil suit for international law violations, 
Judge Richard Posner noted that those standing against criminal liability argue that 
there is no need for it because of civil liability.75 However, in a common law system 
such as the U.S., tort and criminal law may complement each other and serve as 
                                                 
71  See R.A. Duff, Repairing Harms and Answering for Wrongs, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS 212–16 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014); R.A. Duff, Torts, Crimes and Vindication: Whose 
Wrong Is It?, in UNRAVELING TORT AND CRIME 148– 50 (Matthew Dyson ed., 2014). 
72  See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And 
What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992); Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and 
Torts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (1943); J. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on 
the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991). 
73  See Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Procedure, WATSON INSTITUTE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AT BROWN UNIVERSITY 5 (March 30, 2006), https://perma.cc/Y57L-
PBW2 (“Targeted sanctions are typically applied either as incentives to change behavior or as 
preventive measures, as in the case of sanctions against individuals or entities that facilitate terrorist 
acts”). 
74  See generally Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1751 (2005); Cassel, supra note 11, at 17–18 (discussing English cases on international human 
rights and common law torts). 
75  See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1019 (“Corporate criminal liability is criticized…but one of the principal 
criticisms is that it is superfluous given civil liability”). 
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different levers in building accountability within a particular jurisdiction, across 
national systems, and in the international system itself. For example, in the U.S., 
plaintiffs have brought tort claims alleging superior responsibility for almost thirty 
years, but there is still no provision for command responsibility for human rights 
violations in the U.S. criminal code.76 
Judge Posner cites a number of prominent treaties as examples of the 
importance of civil and administrative remedies where criminal remedies are 
unavailable: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, the U.N. International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism, and the U.N. Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime.77 These treaties allow civil and administrative remedies as 
alternatives to criminal liability.78 
In some jurisdictions, tort standards may lead to criminal standards for 
accountability for human rights violations.79 Scholars Leigh Payne and Gabriel 
Pereira have noted a new trend in how countries transitioning from dictatorships 
and/or civil conflict have addressed corporate complicity. While “transitional 
justice” trials of state officials have been predominantly criminal prosecutions, 
when it comes to corporate complicity, civil trials have outnumbered criminal 
trials.80 
Tort remedies do not contain the same constraints as criminal prosecutions. 
One significant difference is the balance of competing interests within a 
governmental office.81 Survivors of human rights violations may secure private or 
public interest attorneys to pursue civil claims on their behalf, and these claims 
are likely subject to fewer political limitations than criminal prosecutions. The 
number of cases brought under the ATS and TVPA far outstripped the number 
                                                 
76 See Letter from Yadh Ben Achour to Pamela Hamoto, Permanent Representative of the United 
States to the United Nations (Oct. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/Z9HG-9C43. 
77  See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1020. 
78  See id. 
79 See Letter from Yadh Ben Achour to Pamela Hamoto, Permanent Representative of the United 
States to the United Nations (Oct. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/Z9HG-9C43. 
80  See Leigh A. Payne and Gabriel Pereira, Accountability for Corporate Complicity in Human Rights 
Violations: Argentina’s Transitional Justice Innovation?, in THE ECONOMIC ACCOMPLICES TO THE 
ARGENTINE DICTATORSHIP: OUTSTANDING DEBTS 29, 29–44 (Horacio Verbitsky & Juan Pablo 
Bohoslavsky eds., 2016). 
81  Indeed, multiple doctrines exist to dismiss cases if a court determines that ruling on the case would 
require the court to pass judgment on the legitimate act of a foreign state (the act of state doctrine) 
or asking courts to perform the functions of one of the other political branches (the political 
question doctrine). 
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of criminal prosecutions for international human rights violations.82 The U.S. 
government has prosecuted and deported Nazi war criminals and prosecuted 
those accused of human rights violations for immigration fraud,83 yet only one 
person, Chuckie Taylor, has been criminally prosecuted for the underlying human 
rights violations (in his case for torture in Liberia).84 In fact, no corporation or 
corporate official has been prosecuted in the U.S. for international human rights 
violations. Tort cases have the potential to provide remedies for human rights 
victims while moving the law forward and giving added impetus to criminal 
prosecutions. 
Criminal prosecution around the world varies according to the level of 
participation afforded to those harmed by the violations. Some countries, such as 
the U.S., Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Indonesia, and South Africa, 
give prosecutors “complete enforcement discretion, with little or no official 
participation by victims or their representatives.”85 Other countries, such as 
Argentina, Germany, Japan, Netherlands Spain, and Ukraine, allow higher levels 
of participation by victims, from participating in the charging decision to the 
appeal of decisions not to prosecute.86 
Finally, and perhaps most important for the analysis of the standards applied 
in human rights tort cases, the jurisprudence on human rights claims looked to 
international criminal law to inform analysis in civil cases. For example, in rulings 
on the definitions of human rights norms, U.S. courts have frequently cited 
international criminal tribunal judgments to inform their rulings about the content 
of customary international law, in particular in cases brought under the ATS and 
TVPA.87 International criminal law has been a primary source of developing 
standards, and U.S. and other national courts have looked to international criminal 
tribunal jurisprudence for guidance when they are ruling on tort cases.88 
                                                 
82  See STEPHENS, CHOMSKY, GREEN, HOFFMAN, & RATNER, supra note 45, at XXVI. 
83  See War Crimes Trials, UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM (last updated July 2, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/8EGM-XGT9; Kate Connolly, Trial of Man Deported from U.S. to Germany for Nazi 
War Crimes to Begin, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2009), https://perma.cc/4T4E-NDT6. 
84  The U.S. federal extraterritorial torture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994), allows prosecution of 
U.S. citizens or residents for torture or attempts or conspiracy to commit torture abroad). 
85  Thompson, supra note 67, at 882. 
86  Id. 
87  See, for example, STEPHENS, CHOMSKY, GREEN, HOFFMAN, & RATNER, supra note 45 at 256–64; see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102 
(sources of customary international law include judgments of international tribunals); Statute of 
International Court of Justice art 38 (same). 
88  See STEPHENS, CHOMSKY, GREEN, HOFFMAN, & RATNER, supra note 45 at 256–64. 
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In the international and domestic systems, accountability for human rights 
victims has incorporated principles from the international criminal system, as well 
as other sources of law. Section III turns to the development of standards for 
private (non-state) superior officers in international law. 
III.  THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARDS 
FOR SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS 
One of the central questions that arises before bringing any charges against 
a defendant (criminal or civil) is whether the law or customary international law 
principle existed prior to an alleged violation. It is widely accepted that it is unfair 
to hold someone accountable for something that was not a legal violation before 
they committed the act.89 The following Section details the development in the 
international legal system of approaches to hold individuals responsible for 
violations committed by those under their supervision, beginning with the 
responsibility of states and military officials and expanding to civilian government 
officials and then to corporate officials. This Section focuses on, but is not limited 
to, standards for private non-state superior responsibility for human rights 
violations. It brings together sources of law pertaining to superior responsibility 
with those sources dealing with private (non-state) responsibility, and includes the 
sources that deal with both. The Section concludes that it has been well established 
for decades that corporate officials can be held liable for international human 
rights violations and war crimes committed by those under their effective control. 
A.  The Historical  Origins of the Command 
Responsibil i ty Doctrine 
Responsibility for the actions of a person under the command of another 
has a long and deep history. Scholars have traced the origins of the concept of 
command responsibility to the Roman Empire90 and the writings of Sun Tzu in 
the sixth century.91 Initial responsibilities accrued to the state (the crown) or 
military officials. In 1439, an edict from Charles VII of France, Ordinance at 
Orleans, stated: “each captain or lieutenant [is] held responsible for the abuses, ills 
and offences committed by members of his company” and must punish 
                                                 
89  See Beth Van Schaack, The Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 101 (2009). 
90  Cf. Arthur Thomas O’Reilly, Command Responsibility: A Call to Realign Doctrine with Principles, 20 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 71, 73 (2004) (“The origins of command responsibility are ancient, with a long 
history of development and practice in the laws of various nations.”). 
91  See William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1973); SUN ZI, 
THE ART OF WAR: SUN ZI’S MILITARY METHODS (Victor H. Mair trans., 2007). 
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offenses.92 If there is a failure to punish or the officer “covers up the misdeed or 
delays taking action, or if, because of his negligence or otherwise, the offender 
escapes and thus evades punishment, the captain shall be deemed responsible for 
the offence as if he had committed it himself and shall be punished in the same 
way as the offender would have been.”93 In 1621, the Articles of War issued by 
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden specified that a commander could issue no 
unlawful orders.94 Scholar Hugo Grotius wrote in 1625: “The State or the Superior 
Powers are accountable for the Crimes of their Subjects, if they know of them, 
and do not prevent them, when they can and ought to do so.”95 
This concept was not just stated as an ideal but was on occasion enforced. 
In one early example, in 1474, the Archduke of Austria ordered the trial of Peter 
von Hagenbach who was charged with responsibility for atrocities committed by 
his subordinates while carrying out orders from his master.96 
Another important step in the evolution of the command responsibility 
doctrine was restitution for victims. During the early twentieth century, numerous 
countries ratified the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Convention of 1929. 
The most commonly cited inception of an affirmative duty to prevent war crimes 
in a treaty is the Hague Conventions.97 The Hague Convention of 1907 also 
specified the duties for restitution to private parties: a belligerent party violating 
provisions “shall if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be 
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”98 
The 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field reinforced duties of military 
“commanders in chief” to comply with the duties in the Convention.99 
                                                 
92  L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 319, 321 (1995) (quoting ORDONNANCES DES ROIS DE FRANCE DE LA TROSIEME RACE 
(Louis Guillaume de Vilevault & Louis G.O.F. de Brequigny eds., 1782) (quoted in THEODOR 
MERON, HENRY’S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE’S LAWS 149 & n. 40 (1993) (emphasis omitted)); see 
O’Reilly, supra note 90, at 74–75. 
93  Green, supra note 92, at 321. 
94  Norman G. Cooper, Gustavus Adolphus and Military Justice, 92 MIL. L. REV. 129, 130 (1981). 
95  HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, ch. 21§ II (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford 1925) 
(1625). 
96  Green, supra note 92. 
97  See Danner &. Martinez, supra note 6, at 122 (“Although its roots probably go deeper, modern 
international law's imposition of an affirmative duty on military commanders to prevent war crimes 
is usually traced to the Hague Conventions of 1907”) (also noting that a few offenders were tried 
before German national courts). 
98  Hague Convention IV Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631, https://perma.cc/G7RJ-9F89. 
99  Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, 
118 L.N.T.S. 303, at art. 26 (June 19, 1931). 
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Codification of the responsibility of civilian superiors, and in particular private 
superiors, began to be more systematically implemented over the course of the 
twentieth century. The following Section explores that development. 
B.  The Increasing Acceptance of Superior Responsibil i ty for 
Private Actors in International Law 
International treaties vary in the degree to which they mention corporate 
officers. Some mention categories of defendants and include both state and non-
state actors, but do not distinguish modes of liability. Other treaties mention both 
potential liability of non-state actors as well as superior responsibility. This Section 
discusses the evolution and range of sources of international law that establish 
standards for non-state actors and codify standards for corporate superior 
officers. Section IV will examine how these standards have been applied in specific 
cases charging superiors for violations of these laws. 
1. The transition from command responsibility to superior 
responsibility. 
The trial of corporate officers for war crimes began after the Second World 
War with the trials of war criminals at Nuremberg throughout the occupied zones 
in Europe, and in Asia at the Tokyo Tribunal and in the subsequent trials in 
Singapore and Hong Kong.100 The two documents establishing the legal basis for 
those trials, the Nuremberg101 and Tokyo Charters for the International Military 
Tribunals (IMT),102 did not explicitly include the terms “command” or “superior 
responsibility;” however, both charters include those with direct superior 
responsibility, such as “leaders, organizers and instigators.”103 These charters state 
that these individuals may be prosecuted when they participate in forming or 
executing a common plan or conspiracy for crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
or crimes against peace, and that they are liable for “all acts performed by any 
persons in execution of such plan.”104 As shown below, “leaders” were not limited 
to military and civilian government officials, but also included industrialists, or 
corporate officers. 
                                                 
100  See Bazyler & Green, supra note 18, at 26. 
101  Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to the London Agreement on War 
Criminals, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. 
102  Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 9, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589 
[hereinafter Tokyo Charter]. 
103  See id. at 23 (“Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible 
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan”).  
104  Id.; Nuremberg Charter, supra note 101, 59 Stat. 1544 at 1252. 
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Neither IMT Charter provided for omission liability.105 This form of superior 
responsibility was made more explicit by laws such as the French Ordinance 
Concerning the Suppression of War Crimes. This law allowed trial in cases 
“[w]here a subordinate is prosecuted as the actual perpetrator of a war crime, and 
his superiors cannot be indicted as being equally responsible, they shall be 
considered as accomplices [insofar] as they have organized or tolerated the 
criminal acts of their subordinates.”106 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions took another important step forward by specifying in international 
treaties (with resulting broader application beyond that of the post-World War II 
national ordinance mentioned above) that superior responsibility extends beyond 
military commanders to civilians. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(“ICRC”) concluded that these two important sources clarified that the status as 
a military or civilian government official was too narrow: “[t]he concept of the 
superior is broader and should be seen in terms of a hierarchy encompassing the 
concept of control.”107 
The doctrine of superior liability as applied to international armed conflict 
was formally codified in 1977 in the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions. Article 86 of Protocol I provides that state parties “shall repress 
grave breaches and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches” of the 
Geneva Convention or Protocol I when they are under a duty to act.108 Superiors 
are responsible “if they knew, or had information which should have enabled 
them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that [a subordinate] was 
committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all 
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.”109 
The language of Article 86 specifically identifies “superiors” (rather than 
“commanders”) and is not limited to military or civilian government officials. Nor 
does Article 86 distinguish between the type of responsibility for civilian superiors 
                                                 
105  Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 573, 573 (1999). 
106  Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 336 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former 
Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), https://perma.cc/F2XJ-PL6Y (translating Ordonnance du 28 aout 1944 
rleave a la repression des crimes de guerre, reprinted in 4 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 88 (1948)). 
107  International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1013 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno 
Zimmermann eds., 1987). See also Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate 
Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 
114 & n. 31 (2012) (discussing the influence of the ICRC in interpreting humanitarian law). 
108  Protocol I, supra note 21. 
109  Id. 
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and military superiors—more specifically, it makes no distinction between 
government and private officials, such as corporate officers, nor between civilian 
leaders with governmental authority and those whose authority is derived from 
their positions in non-governmental entities. The definitive characteristic of 
superior responsibility is the superior’s effective control over the subordinates 
who directly participated in the violations.110 
 In the 1990s, two tribunals were established by resolutions of the U.N. 
Security Council to try alleged perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The statutes of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) include superior liability. The 
common relevant clause reads: “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or 
execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be 
individually responsible for the crime.”111 A superior is responsible “if he knew or 
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had 
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.”112 
During the process of creating the ICTY, the U.N. Secretary General 
described superior responsibility as “imputed responsibility or criminal 
negligence,”113 instead of a strict liability standard. Scholars have commented that 
                                                 
110  See METTRAUX supra note 6, at 38. 
111  Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 827, May 25 1993, as amended 
by Res. 1166, Res. 1329, Res. 1411, Res. 1431, Res. 1481, Res. 1597, Res. 1660, Res. 1837, and Res. 
1877 [hereinafter ICTY Statute], Article 7(3); see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 
January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 955 of 8 November 
1994, as amended by Res. 1165 (1998), Res. 1329 (2000), 1411 (2002), and 1431 (2002) [hereinafter 
ICTR Statute], Art 6(3), https://perma.cc/4RL6-BDXG (“The fact that any of the acts referred to 
in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her 
superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate 
was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof”). 
112  ICTY Statute, supra note 110, art.7 ¶ 3; ICTR Statute, supra note 110, at art. 6 ¶ 3. 
113  William A. Schabas, Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 1015, 1026 (2003) (citing Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704, ¶ 56 (1993)); see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER 
MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
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the latter could be unfair and “impose responsibility on the superior even when 
an unruly subordinate has disobeyed direct orders to stop human rights abuses.”114  
Scholars analyzing the expansion of superior responsibility doctrine have 
often focused on the differences between military and civilian hierarchies.115 
Military hierarchies have the ability to court-martial and there is a higher 
expectation of obedience to commanders, the argument goes.116 One body to 
distinguish between military and civilian superior responsibility was the ICC. The 
ICC provided similar but not identical standards in the document establishing the 
ICC’s parameters, the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome 
Statute),117 which specifies that civilian superiors can be held accountable for 
crimes committed by their subordinates. Article 28(b) states: “With respect to 
superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a) [addressing 
military superiors], a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective 
authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such subordinates.”118 
For both military and civilian superiors, Article 28 of the Rome Statute 
adopts the “effective control” test; in the case of private civilians, that control 
must be over subordinates, but there is no requirement that the superior control 
be acting under government or military authority. The ICC is also consistent with 
the previous standard of “effective control.” 
The Rome Statute distinguishes civilian and military officials based on the 
level of knowledge necessary for criminal culpability. Specifically, military 
superiors are responsible if they “knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should 
have known” that the subordinates “were committing or about to commit crimes,” 
whereas non-military superiors are responsible if they “knew, or consciously disregarded 
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or were 
about to commit such crimes.”119 
                                                 
YUGOSLAVIA 345-74 (1996). 
114  Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate 
of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65, 101 (1995). 
115  See, for example, Yael Ronen, Superior Responsibility of Civilians for International Crimes Committed in Civilian 
Settings, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 313 (2010); METTRAUX, supra note 6, at 100–25. 
116  See, for example, Danner & Martinez, supra note 6, at 148 (citing Hague Convention of 1907 and in 
re Yamashita (limits imposed by professional military). 
117  See generally Rome Statute, supra note 28. 
118  Id. at 106. 
119  Id. (emphasis added). 
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Since the Rome Statute was created for the specific purpose of establishing 
the duties and parameters of that court, it does not necessarily reflect customary 
international law; instead, it defines what can be heard by that particular court. In 
addition, the history of the negotiations over the Rome Statute indicate that this 
statute was “a quite delicate compromise”120 rather than reflecting the state of 
customary international law.121 Roger Clark, present for the negotiations, noted 
that the Tokyo war crimes standard was in the ICC drafts until China and the 
Untied States “engineered the distinction now in Article 28.”122 
According to numerous scholars, customary international law provides for a 
common standard between military and non-military superiors and the ICC 
distinction is the outlier.123 One, Guenael Mettraux, concludes the ICC standard 
for non-military superiors is regarded as consistent with customary international 
law while the standard of military liability is looser than under customary 
international law; this looser standard may have resulted from the goal to facilitate 
prosecutions.124 Other scholars argue that a mens rea standard of “conscious 
disregard” is a higher standard than “should have known” or “had reason to 
know” and could “eliminate culpability for negligent supervision.”125 Still others 
argue the meaning of the “conscious disregard” language has yet to be determined 
because of the lack of case law applying the standard to non-military superiors.126 
This distinction is not reflected in tribunal statutes other than the Statute of 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which introduced a new variation on mens rea 
for its particular court, providing that both military and civilian superiors shall be 
criminally responsible for statute violations “committed by subordinates under his 
                                                 
120  U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1.SR.23. 3 July 1998 Section 2; U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
183/C.1/WGGP/L.4, report of the Working Group on General Principles of Criminal Law, 18 
June 1998. 
121  Roger Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences, 12 CRIM. L. F. 291, 315 & n. 80 (2001). 
122  Id. (noting that “Article 28 was hardly one of the successes of codification at Rome”) (citing Richard 
Baxter, The Effects of Ill-Conceived Codification and Development of International Law, in RECUEIL C’EDUDES 
DE EDROIT INTERNATIONAL EN HOMMAGE A PAUL GUGGENHEIM 146 (1968)). 
123  See METTRAUX, supra note 6, at 101 (“Under customary law, the state of mind that must be proved 
is the same for all categories of superiors.”). 
124  Id. at 26–27. Non-military superiors include civilian governmental officials as well as corporate and 
other non-governmental superiors. 
125  Clark, supra note 121, at 315 & n. 80 (describing the civilian standard as “some kind of 
recklessness/willful blindness/knowledge test). 
126  See Major James D. Levine, II, The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Application to Superior 
Civilian Leadership: Does the International Criminal Court have the Correct Standard?, 193 MIL. L. REV. 52, 
83 (2007); Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 89, 110 (2000). 
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or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such subordinates, where: [ ] the superior either knew, or 
consciously disregarded information that clearly indicated that subordinates were 
committing or about to commit such crimes.”127 
Since 2000, other “hybrid” tribunals combining international and national 
aspects have been created to hold violators accountable for war crimes and human 
rights violations including in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Cambodia. The founding documents for these tribunals include provisions for 
superior responsibility parallel to those of the ICTY and the ICTR, adopting the 
“effective control” and “knew or had reason to know” standards.128 Although 
enacted after the ICC’s Rome Statute, the statutes and resolutions for the courts 
that followed the ICC did not include an explicit distinction between civilian and 
military superiors. 
The 2002 Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone illustrates this 
common language that there may be superior responsibility for crimes against 
humanity, violations of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
the 1977 Additional Protocol II and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law “if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate 
was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take 
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts to punish the 
perpetrators thereof.”129 The Sierra Leone statute also provides that the court may 
order defendants to pay fines, forfeitures including restitution, rehabilitation, and 
compensation.130 
This area of international “black letter” law established to criminally 
prosecute superior officers, has reached a consensus on the principle of potential 
liability for corporate officers where the superior exercised “effective control” 
over the subordinate and failed to take steps to prevent or punish acts of genocide, 
war crimes, or crimes against humanity by their subordinates. All of these sources 
of law provide for superior responsibility for private as well as state actors. On the 
mens rea elements of superior responsibility, there have been some distinctions 
between the standard of whether a superior “knew or had reason to know” or 
                                                 
127  Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, art. 3 ¶ 2 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter 
Lebanon Statute]. 
128  See, for example, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315, art. 6 ¶ 3 (Aug. 16, 
2000), https://perma.cc/P7R3-98EL [hereinafter Sierra Leone Statute]; Law on the Establishment 
of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, with the inclusion of amendments as 
promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006), art. 29 (Oct. 27, 2004), 
https://perma.cc/R4FD-LN3B. 
129  Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 128, art. 6 ¶ 3. 
130  See id. at art. 19. 
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whether a superior showed “conscious disregard” for information about ongoing 
or imminent violations. In terms of numbers and trends, the dominant trend 
among the statutes for mens rea is to hold a superior accountable when he or she 
knew or had reason to know about a subordinate’s violation. These international 
criminal law documents are not conclusive, however. Additional clarification by 
the criminal tribunals is still needed and it is necessary to delve into other sources 
of law, as the following Sections explore. 
2. Additional sources of law for private actor responsibility. 
In addition to documents that provide for the prosecution of superior 
officers, major international instruments offer further, longstanding support for 
the principle that private actors can be held responsible for their role in violations 
of international law, including when they are in a position of superior 
responsibility. This body of law includes international treaties and other sources 
focused on human rights, as well as sources that deal with other substantive issues, 
such as maritime law. Although many of these sources do not make specific 
reference to superior responsibility, they contain broad language that has been 
widely interpreted to include this form of liability. This body of law complements 
and strengthens the law codified by the founding documents of the international 
tribunals and is further strengthened by the cases that have interpreted these laws 
in international and domestic tribunals. 
a) Sources of law that are explicit on both private actors and applicability of superior 
liability 
One of the treaties that addresses both superior responsibility and culpability 
for private actors is the Convention on Enforced Disappearances, which provides 
that, States Parties “shall take the necessary measures to hold criminally 
responsible . . . [superiors] who (i) Knew, or consciously disregarded information 
which clearly indicated, that subordinates under his or her effective authority and 
control were committing or about to commit a crime of enforced disappearance; 
(ii) Exercised effective responsibility for and control over activities which were 
concerned with the crime of enforced disappearance; and (iii) Failed to take all 
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress 
the commission of an enforced disappearance or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”131 The Convention on 
Disappearances also noted that these provisions were “without prejudice to the 
higher standards of responsibility applicable under international law to a military 
commander or to a person effectively acting as a military commander.”132 There 
                                                 
131  International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances art. 
6(b), opened for signature Feb. 6, 2007, 2716 U.N.T.S 48088 (entered into force Dec. 20, 2006), 
https://perma.cc/C2U2-QG3U. 
132  Id. at art. 6(c). 
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is no requirement of state action in the definition of the norm: both governmental 
and non-state actors may be liable. An additional area of law that specifies that a 
superior may be liable is maritime law. For example, the 1974 Athens Convention 
relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, provides that a 
carrier is liable for damage resulting from death or personal injury due to the fault 
or neglect of the carrier or of his servants or agents acting within the scope of 
their employment.133 
b) Sources providing for private actor liability (which courts then apply to superior 
officers) 
In addition to those sources of law that are explicit about the application of 
superior responsibility to private actors, there is a body of law that incorporates 
the legal obligations of private parties, and which courts have interpreted to be 
applicable to superior officers. These sources extend back almost two centuries. 
For instance, specially established courts’ ruling on the slave trade during the 
nineteenth century are an overlooked source of international law that addressed 
violations by private parties.134 Between 1817 and 1871, the U.S., U.K., 
Netherlands, and Portugal entered into treaties that established international 
courts to suppress the slave trade; these courts seized the ships and divided the 
assets.135 
In the twentieth century, a number of human rights treaties contained 
provisions that indicated that they applied to private actors. For example, Article 
IV of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide provides, “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally 
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”136 Both U.S. and 
international courts have held that genocide violates international law when it is 
                                                 
133  See Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea art. 3, 
(Dec. 13, 1974), 1463 U.N.T.S. 19; See also United Nations Convention on International Multimodal 
Transport of Goods art. 15, opened for signature Sept. 1, 1980, U.N. Doc. TD/MT/CONF/16 (stating 
that an operator is “liable for the acts and omissions of his servants or agents, when any such servant 
or agent is acting within the scope of his employment, or of any other person of whose services he 
makes use for the performance of the multimodal transport contract, when such person is acting 
in the performance of the contract, as if such acts and omissions were his own”). 
134  See Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 
550, 552 (2008) (“Though all but forgotten today, these antislavery courts were the first 
international human rights courts”). 
135  Id. at 552. 
136  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 4, opened for signature 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). 
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committed by state or non-state actors137 and also includes those in positions of 
superior responsibility.138 
The Convention against Torture (CAT) prohibits torture “inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.”139 Both public and private persons can be 
held accountable; the language is “any person,” although there must be some state 
action by one of the participants in the torture. The Committee against Torture, 
the body of internationally renowned experts that the Convention established for 
its enforcement, discusses “acts of torture . . . committed by non-State officials or 
private actors.”140 CAT General Comment 3, on the Convention’s Article 14, 
discusses the state responsibility for a right to redress, effective remedy, and 
reparations in situations in which “state authorities knew or have reasonable 
grounds to believe that acts of torture or ill-treatment had been committed by 
non-state officials or private actors and failed to exercise due diligence to prevent, 
investigate and punish, . . . the state bears responsibility to provide redress to the 
victims.”141 
A range of treaties specify that all categories of “persons” (natural and legal) 
are intended to be included by their provisions, including treaties on racial 
                                                 
137  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 & n. 20 (2004) (“sufficient consensus . . . that 
genocide by private actors violate international law”) (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–
41 (2d Cir. 1995)); Case Concerning Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. ¶ 398 (Feb. 26). 
138  See Caroline Fournet, The Universality of the Prohibition of Crime of Genocide, 1948–2008, 19 INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. REV. 132, 144 (2009) (stating that the prohibition against genocide is jus cogens); see generally 
Tahlia Petrosian, Secondary Forms of Genocide and Command Responsibility under the Statutes of the ICTY, 
ICTR and ICC, 17 AUSTL. INT’L L. J. 29 (2010). 
139  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1985).  
140  Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties ¶ 18, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4 (Nov. 23, 2007). 
141  Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 3: Implementation of Article 14 by States Parties, ¶ 7, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 (Dec. 13, 2012).  
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discrimination,142 apartheid,143 environmental hazards,144 and organized crime.145 
Other treaties with similarly general provisions include the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states that each state party 
“undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant”;146 the 
Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which states 
that governments must “prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means 
including legislation . . . racial discrimination by any persons, group or 
organization”;147 and the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), which states as its goal to “eliminate discrimination 
against women by any person, organization or enterprise.”148 
As discussed below, these sources of law, which provide for private liability, 
have been interpreted to cover superior officers and thus strengthen the 
international legal basis for corporate superior officer liability. 
3. Due diligence in international business and human rights standards. 
The due diligence concept in the core human rights documents has also been 
                                                 
142  See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for 
signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212; (entered into force Jan. 6, 1969) [hereinafter CERD]; 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States of America, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (Mar. 5, 2008). 
143  See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid art. 
I(2), ¶ 2, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 18, 1976) 
(declaring apartheid criminal). 
144  See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature Nov. 
29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 19, 1975); Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 
1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 (entered into force May 5, 1992); Convention on Third Party Liability in 
the Field of Nuclear Energy, opened for signature July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251. (entered into force 
Apr. 1, 1968). 
145  See United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 10 ¶ 1, opened for 
signature Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (entered into force Sept. 29, 2003) (“Each State Party 
shall adopt such measures as may be necessary consistent with its legal principles, to establish the 
liability of legal persons for participation in serious crimes involving an organized criminal group 
for the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention.”). 
146  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 2 ¶ 1, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
147  CERD, supra note 136, art. 2 ¶ 1(d). 
148  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 2(e), opened for 
signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
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a central aspect of the recent articulation of business and human rights standards 
in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. 
The due diligence principle in the U.N. Guiding Principles advocates for the 
implementation of “human rights” due diligence to identify, prevent, mitigate, and 
account for how to address business impacts on human rights.149 These principles 
include the identification of key risks related to the type of business and the 
geographical area of operation, and the existence of a plan of action to prevent or 
mitigate risks. The latter are based on both technical data and consultations with 
potentially affected people and other relevant stakeholders, specific actions 
triggered once abuses are reported, and disclosure of specific policies and 
processes undertaken to identity and address key risks. Standards for business 
have also drawn increasing attention in regional bodies and within nation states. 
The Working Group on Human Rights and Business has made important 
headway in seeking common ground among sectors, encouraging businesses to 
move toward respect for human rights.150 
Other sources of “soft,” or non-binding, law such as U.N. declarations, also 
support the principles of private liability and superior responsibility for human 
rights violations. For instance, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
“provide those who claim to be victims of a human rights or humanitarian law 
violation with equal and effective access to justice, . . . irrespective of who may 
ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation.”151 
These multiple sources of soft international law, especially detailed guides 
on business and human rights, flesh out the obligations and methodology for due 
diligence standards to protect, respect and remedy human rights violations. 
C. World War II Tribunal Prosecutions of Non-State as Well  as 
State Officials  
This Section will go beyond the text of international instruments and 
examine the jurisprudence for corporate officers from the international tribunals 
                                                 
149  See What Are the Voluntary Principles?, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 
https://perma.cc/EJ9N-9LWZ. 
150  See Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, at 2 (July 6, 2011). 
151  G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶ 3(c) (Dec. 16, 2005). 
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established to try war criminals of the Second World War. The Nuremberg trials, 
the follow-up Allied Zone cases,152 and the Tokyo (“Far East”) tribunals all 
included “industrialists” as defendants, confirming that these early tribunals 
applied international law regardless of the status of the defendant (military, civilian 
governmental leader or private citizen); instead the test identified in the case law 
is conduct-focused—whether superiors demonstrated a culpable failure to take 
reasonable steps to prevent or punish international crimes of those under their 
control. 
1. Nuremberg and Allied Zone Cases. 
The Nuremberg tribunals broke new ground by holding individuals 
accountable for international law violations.153 During World War II, the U.N. 
issued a number of statements indicating its intention to bring to trial those enemy 
personnel who were guilty of war crimes and these individuals included corporate 
defendants, or “industrialists.” The underlying principle, that corporate structure 
did not provide a shield from prosecution, was stated by Justice Robert Jackson: 
“While it is quite proper to employ the fiction of responsibility of a state or 
corporation for the purpose of imposing a collective liability, it is quite intolerable 
to let such a legalism become the basis of personal immunity.”154 
Superior responsibility doctrine was applied in the military tribunals set up 
by the four Allied Powers under Allied Control Council Law No. 10.155 The cases 
most often cited for the development of the doctrine are U.S. v. List and others (The 
Hostages Cases) and The High Command Case. In both of these cases, German military 
officers were held liable because they were found to possess knowledge of their 
subordinates’ abuses and had power to halt the abuses but failed to exercise the 
power that they had.156 The Hostages Cases discussed the duties of the supervisor 
“for maintaining peace and order, and the prevention of crime” and the “should 
have known” standard: knowledge could be attributed to the commander because 
he ignored reports of “terrorism and intimidation being carried out by units of the 
                                                 
152  The “Nuremberg Trials” include the Major War Criminals tried at the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) from 1945 to 1946 and the subsequent Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
(NMT) trials of lower-ranking Nazis conducted by the Americans in Nuremberg and by France, 
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in their respective zones of occupied Germany. 
153  See Bazyler & Green, supra note 18, at 41. 
154  Id. at 41. 
155  See Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and 
Against Humanity (Dec. 20, 1945), reprinted in 1 ENACTMENTS AND APPROVED PAPERS OF THE 
CONTROL COUNCIL AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE 306; Levine, supra note 126 at 57; Bantekas, 
supra note 105, at 573; Andrew D. Mitchell, Failure to Halt, Prevent or Punish: The Doctrine of Command 
Responsibility for War Crimes, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 381, 388 (2000). 
156  See generally 8 UN War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 70–82 (1949). 
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field.”157 It was the commander’s duty to know: “Any failure to acquaint 
themselves with the contents of such reports, or a failure to require additional 
reports where inadequacy appears on their face, constitutes a dereliction of duty 
which he cannot use in his own behalf.”158 
The Tribunal also held that there was a duty to condemn and punish and a 
“practical coercive deterrent” to high-ranking officials ordering or acquiescing in 
human rights violations. With regard to acts upon which he was on notice (in this 
case, the killings of innocent people): “Not once did he condemn such acts as 
unlawful. Not once did he call to account those responsible for these inhumane 
and barbarous acts. His failure to terminate these unlawful killings and to take 
adequate steps to prevent their recurrence, constitutes a serious breach of duty 
and imposes criminal responsibility.”159 
The Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT) also found defendants liable where 
they did not have authoritative control over the state or military apparatus.160 In 
one exemplary case, known as “The Medical Trial,” sixteen medical doctors and 
officials were charged with responsibility for medical experiments including 
subjecting people held in concentration camps to extreme temperatures and 
infecting them with diseases including typhus.161 The defendants included 
Siegfried Handloser, Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service. Handloser was 
convicted of responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
by subordinates because he knew of the abuses—including those that resulted in 
the deaths of prisoners, and that the abuses were likely to continue, and yet he 
failed to investigate, prevent, or punish the offenses or “exercise any proper 
degree of control over those conducting experiments within his field of authority and 
competence.”162 Mere awareness was not sufficient for conviction; other defendants 
who were aware of the experiments were acquitted because they did not have 
supervisory authority.163 Analyzing this conviction and the acquittals together 
provides further evidence that the factors in culpability were knowledge and 
control over subordinates for a finding of superior responsibility. 
                                                 
157  Id. at 69–70 
158  Id. at 71. 
159  Id. at 71. 
160  See KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 266–71 (2011). 
161  See generally 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, at 171, 199–206 (1949). 
162  Id. at 206 (emphasis added). 
163  Id. at 208–10. For a further discussion of the Medical Trials, see Matthew Lippman, Fifty Years After 
Auschwitz: Prosecutions of Nazi Death Camp Defendants, 11 CONN. J. INT’L L. 199, 236–42 (1996). 
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Nuremberg prosecutors were explicit about their ability to try civilian 
economic leaders.164 One, Leo M. Drachsler, described Control Council Law No. 
10 as extending to “industrialists . . . in their representative capacity, as officers of 
the leading German economic institutions, as corporate officials of their own 
organizations, and as individuals.”165 The Tribunals were clear that industrialists 
could be held liable for acts undertaken as supervisors. In one often cited case, 
Government Commissioner v. Roechling, the tribunal found senior officials in the 
Roechling firm responsible for abuse of laborers, who included prisoners of war, 
despite the fact that it was Gestapo soldiers who physically abused the laborers.166 
The Tribunal held that “Hermann Roechling and the other accused members of 
the Directorate of the Voelklingen works are not accused of having ordered this 
horrible treatment, but of having permitted it; and indeed supported it, and in addition, of 
not having done their utmost to put an end to these abuses.”167 Roechling’s son-in-law was 
found to possess the authority “to obtain an alleviation in the treatment of these 
workers,” but, despite this authority, he did not address the violations.168 
Therefore, the Tribunal found his son-in-law responsible. The standard applied 
to find these officials culpable had three elements defined in the statutes of the 
modern tribunals—effective control, knowledge of the abuse, and the ability to 
stop the abuse but the failure to do so. 
In the Pohl case, the defendants before the NMT included Karl 
Mummenthey, a Waffen SS officer169 who managed mining companies, factories, 
and quarries in the Nazi concentration camp. Mummenthey supervised laborers 
who were enslaved and presided over the administration of concentration camps. 
He attempted to evade liability by arguing that he was merely a “private 
businessman in no way associated with the sternness and rigor of SS discipline, 
                                                 
164  See L.C. Green, supra note 92, at 333–40; Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military 
Superiors in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 89, 105 (2000); Kai Ambos, 
Superior Responsibility, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY 823, 828 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002). 
165  Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What 
Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1159 (2009) (quoting LEO M. DRACHSLER, 
INDICTMENT OF THE INDUSTRIALISTS 22 (Sept. 28, 1946), Gantt Collection in Towson University 
Archives, at box R). 
166  See Gov’t Comm’r of the Gen. Trib. of the Military Gov’t for the French Zone of Occupation in 
Germany v. Roechling, Indictment, 14 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military 
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 1061 Appendix B (1950) [hereinafter Roechling 
Case]. For a discussion of the Roechling Case, see Rehan Abeyratne, Superior Responsibility and the 
Principle of Legality at the ECCC, 44 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 39, 73–74 (2012). 
167  See id. at 73 (quoting an appellate judgment on the case) (emphasis added). 
168  See id. at 120 & n. 220. 
169  Armed wing of the Nazi party’s Schutzstaffel, SS, or “Protective Squadron.” 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 482 Vol. 17 No. 2 
and entirely detached from concentration camp routine.”170 The NMT did not 
accept this defense, finding that “[i]f excesses occurred in the industries under his 
control he was in a position not only to know about them, but to do something.”171 
The Tribunal also rejected Mummenthey’s claims of ignorance, stating that his 
“assertions that he did not know what was happening in the labor camps and 
enterprises under his jurisdiction does not exonerate him. It was his duty to 
know.”172 
Between August 1947 and July 1948, the NMT in United States v. Krauch [Trial 
No. 6], put on trial twenty-four directors of I.G. Farben.173 Farben supplied 
Zyklon B poison gas used in the German concentration camps to murder millions, 
conducted notorious medical experiments upon unwilling prisoners at Auschwitz, 
and operated a massive industrial complex next to Auschwitz that subjected 
prisoners to forced labor, most of whom died from hunger, disease, or 
exhaustion.174 
Ten of the corporate officers were acquitted, with the remainder found guilty 
and receiving prison terms ranging from eight years to time already served (one 
and a half years).175 The court was explicit about the responsibility of these 
corporate officers: 
[W]here private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to exploit the 
military occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and consent 
of the former owner, such action, not being expressly justified . . . , is in 
violation of international law. . . . Similarly where a private individual or a 
juristic person becomes a party to unlawful confiscation of public or private 
property by planning and executing a well-defined design to acquire such 
property permanently, acquisition under such circumstances subsequent to 
the confiscation constitutes conduct in violation of [international law].176 
Other prominent trials of industrialists include Alfried Krupp, as the sole 
owner of Krupp, was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment and ordered to 
forfeit all his property under Control Council Law No. 10.177 
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2. The Pacific Region Cases. 
In addition to the Nuremberg cases, another important source of 
jurisprudence on superior responsibility was the system set up to try war criminals 
in the Pacific region after the Second World War. Superior responsibility was 
named in the founding documents for the tribunals, one of the most cited cases 
(against General Yamashita) began here, and the Pacific Region tribunals also put 
industrialists on trial for war crimes. 
The Chinese Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals (1946) specifically 
held superiors responsible for failing to prevent crimes of their subordinates and 
was stated in broad terms, applying to “persons” and including omissions: 
“Persons who occupy a supervisory or commanding position in relation to war 
criminals and in their capacity as such have not fulfilled their duty to prevent 
crimes from being committed by their subordinates shall be treated as the 
accomplices of such war criminals.”178 
Pursuant to the Tokyo Charter, which established tribunals to try war crimes 
in the Pacific region, the Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita was tried for 
atrocities committed by troops under his command in the Philippines in the 
closing days of the war.179 The military commission found that “there was a 
deliberate plan and purpose to massacre and exterminate a large part of the civilian 
population of Batangas Province and to devastate and destroy… more than 
25,000 men, women, children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians were brutally 
mistreated and killed”180 The Tribunal concluded “the crimes were so extensive 
and widespread, both as to time and area, that they must either have been willfully 
permitted by the accused, or secretly ordered by the accused.”181 Yamashita could 
be held liable for the conduct of those under his command because a commander 
has a “duty to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control 
the troops under his command,” rather than those within his formal mandate or 
authority.182 The decision was a controversial one, and two scholars commented 
that “in many ways, the evolution of command responsibility doctrine has 
                                                 
178  Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 337 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former 
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consisted of reactions and counter-reactions to Yamashita.”183 The criticisms 
included dissenting U.S. Supreme Court justices, which are discussed below. 
Yamashita was not alone in addressing command responsibility for war 
crimes in the Pacific region during World War II, and the Far East tribunals 
included at least one case against officers of a corporation, the Kinkaseki Mine, 
operating in Taiwan from 1942–1945. Nine civilian Nippon employees were tried 
before the British War Crimes Court in Hong Kong in 1947 and charged with 
mistreating prisoners of war forced to work in the mines.184 The defendants 
included the general manager, two production managers, a production supervisor 
and five foremen. Toda Mitsuga, the General Manager, was among those who 
were found guilty.185 
The tribunal rejected Toda’s arguments that the military was responsible for 
the treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) at the mine. The rejection was based 
on Toda’s testimony that POWs were paid by the company and that he received 
weekly or monthly reports from subordinate company officials about “the amount 
of work done, the amount of ore extracted, purchases of stones and 
expenditures.”186 Toda was found guilty, but the court provided no reasoning for 
its sentence. 
The delineation of modes of responsibility in the Royal Warrant Regulation 
8(ii) took a procedural approach that “where there was evidence that a war crime 
had been the result of concerted action upon the part of a unit or a group of men,” 
it is “prima facie evidence of the responsibility of each member of that unit or 
group for that crime.”187 “[T]he Hong Kong indictments” have been interpreted 
“to include a nascent version of the doctrine of command responsibility.”188 
The tribunal concluded that the private mining company was responsible for 
the conditions and mistreatment, including forced labor, at the mine for prisoners 
of war who had been transferred to them by the Japanese Army.189 
The tribunals established at the conclusion of the Second World War have 
been one of the most often cited bases in human rights law: the prosecution of 
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corporate officers in the “industrialist trials” in both Europe and the Pacific 
provide an important legal foundation for applying superior responsibility to 
corporate officers committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
IV.  SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS  
For the past two decades, an additional source of legal standards on superior 
responsibility has been the jurisprudence of international tribunals that were 
created to address genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in particular 
countries or regions; the most extensive jurisprudence to be developed so far has 
come out of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The statutes creating 
these tribunals are described above in Section III. In applying these legal 
standards, the tribunals have further developed the law on superior responsibility, 
including when it is applicable to private corporate officials. The tribunals focus 
on the conduct itself rather than the status of the individual responsible for the 
violation: the elements of the test are whether a superior (1) has “effective control” 
over subordinates, (2) knew or had reason to know about the alleged violation, 
and (3) failed to take measures to prevent the abuse or punish the perpetrator. 
A.  Affirming the Effective Control Standard for Private 
Actors: The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
As discussed in Section III, after the wave of atrocities in the early 1990s in 
the former Yugoslavia, the U.N. Security Council created an international criminal 
tribunal with jurisdiction to try individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide in the countries making up the former Yugoslavia: 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. In the cases that came before them 
between the mid-1990s to the present, the ICTY issued a number of decisions 
that explained the elements of superior responsibility. Civilian superiors, including 
those who were not state officials, were among the defendants who came before 
the tribunals, and the ICTY issued important decisions making clear that civilians 
could be held responsible under a superior responsibility theory. 
In 1998, the ICTY issued the first modern decision on the elements of 
superior responsibility. In the former Yugoslavia, a number of the defendants 
were non-state actors and in Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al (Celebici), the ICTY ruled that 
“the applicability of the principle of superior responsibility in Article 7(3) extends 
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not only to military commanders but also to individuals in non-military positions 
of superior authority.”190 
In this analysis of the applicability of superior responsibility to civilian as well 
as military officials, the tribunal explained that the superior responsibility could 
apply whether or not there was a de jure hierarchical structure.191 The Celebici 
Appeals Chamber confirmed that the necessary relationship between superior and 
subordinate was one of “effective control.”192 The ICTY looked to Nuremberg’s 
Pohl case as a relevant precedent on superior responsibility and noted that 
information was available to put on notice for the need for further investigation.193 
The tribunal’s reasoning states that command responsibility is not a form of strict 
liability. While not strict liability, the standard for superior liability was greater than 
ordinary negligence and recklessness.194 In Prosecutor v. Blaskic, the ICTY explained 
that the “indicators of effective control are more a matter of evidence than of 
substantive law.”195 The elements of effective control identified in this decision 
were the power to prevent international crimes, punish perpetrators, to refer the 
offenders to appropriate authorities.196 
The ICTY identified the sources of customary international law with respect 
to superior responsibility and its application to cases involving both international 
and internal armed conflict, and to both military and civilian superiors.197 Its 
decisions repeated the elements of effective control between a superior and 
subordinate, whether the superior “knew or had reason to know about a 
forthcoming or past violation, and the failure to prevent a predicted violation or 
punish violations within the superior’s knowledge.”198 
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B.  Applying the Effective Control Standard to Corporate 
Superior Officers:  The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) 
The ICTR, created to address genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity for the atrocities in Rwanda in 1994, also clearly stated that superior 
responsibility applied to civilian as well as military officials. In one key case, the 
Bagilishema panel stated that, “[T]here can be no doubt, therefore, that the doctrine 
of command responsibility extends beyond the responsibility of military 
commanders to encompass civilian superiors in positions of authority.”199 Most 
relevant to this Article’s analysis, the ICTR has found business leaders culpable 
under charges of superior responsibility where they had effective control over 
those committing the violations, where they knew or had reason to know about 
the crimes and the superior officer could have taken action to prevent or punish 
the violation, but failed to do so. 
In one case against the director of the Gisovo Tea Factory, an ICTR Trial 
Chamber found Alfred Musema responsible as a superior officer because he 
“exercised de jure authority over [tea factory] employees” and because he “was in 
a position, by virtue of these powers, to take reasonable measures, such as 
removing, or threatening to remove, an individual from his or her position at the 
Tea Factory if he or she was identified as a perpetrator of crimes punishable under 
the Statute.”200 
In another widely discussed case, The Media Case, an ICTR Appeals Chamber 
analyzed the legal standards for superiors in a private company running a Rwandan 
radio station and newspapers and held that superiors could be culpable for 
violations committed by their subordinates.201 The Chamber ruled that corporate 
officials with effective control over their subordinates who “knew or had reason 
to know” subordinates were about to commit crimes and failed to prevent or 
punish acts inciting genocide, could be held criminally responsible for these 
violations.202 
The Chamber upheld the conviction of Ferdinand Nahimana, the radio 
station’s founder and manager, for his subordinates’ acts of inciting genocide.203 
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An important aspect of the decision was its distinction between superior 
responsibility and direct instigation of genocide: the Appeals Chamber dismissed 
charges of direct instigation due to lack of evidence against Nahimana, despite its 
finding of his responsibility as a superior.204 The Appeals Chamber also 
emphasized that that this was not a case in which the defendant was a de facto 
military commander and that the army was not even in control.205 The Media Case 
allows for “double-derivative liability,” finding that superior liability applies even 
when the subordinate is merely an accomplice to a third-party perpetrator (that is, 
failing to prevent or punish a subordinate who aids and abets or incites another in 
the commission of a crime). 
In contrast, on the charges of superior responsibility inciting genocide, the 
Appeals Chamber found insufficient evidence against Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, 
the radio station’s co-founder, and Hassan Ngeze, who was held criminally 
responsible for personally inciting genocide in the newspaper he controlled. The 
Chamber concluded that Barayagwiza had effective control over his subordinates 
only at a time that was too distant from the genocide to hold him criminally 
responsible; during the period of genocidal incitement at the radio station, he did 
not have effective control over his subordinates.206 Although Hassan Ngeze 
published “criminal statements” in his newspaper and the Appeals Chamber 
upheld his conviction for personally inciting genocide, the Chamber concluded 
that it could not uphold the conviction for superior responsibility because he did 
not have effective control over his subordinates. 207 
The nuanced approach demonstrated by the ICTR shows the careful 
application of the multi-pronged test of superior responsibility: if there is evidence 
of effective control of subordinates, private actors, including corporate officers, 
have been held accountable for human rights violations that they were found to 
have known about and failed to attempt to prevent or punish. 
C. The Hybrid Tribunals  
As mentioned above, in addition to the international tribunals created to 
address genocide and other violations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
tribunals combining international and national laws and procedural aspects were 
created to address other patterns of atrocities across the world. As these tribunals 
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move forward, they are adopting theories of superior responsibility for corporate 
officials. 
One case that has been heard by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has 
addressed corporate individuals. In the first such Hybrid Tribunal case to address 
corporate officers, the Lebanon Tribunal proceeded against a private corporate 
official, Ms. Karma Mohamed Tahsin Al Khayat, for publishing the names of 
“purported confidential witnesses.”208 In that case on contempt charges, the court 
convicted Ms. Khayat, who authorized the broadcasts on Al Jadeed TV and then 
authorized the transfer of the broadcasts onto Al Jadeed’s website and Youtube 
page.209 She further had the authority to remove these broadcasts. In exercising 
her authority, she acted on behalf of Al Jadeed TV.210 
The modern tribunals, ICTY, ICTR and hybrid tribunals, have given careful 
attention to legal standards and the application to particular cases of private actors, 
finding that business officials as well as military and civilian government officials 
can be found liable for human rights violations. These tribunals have applied the 
multiple prongs of the test of superior responsibility to limit the application to 
those officials who had effective control over the subordinates who physically 
committed the violations. 
V.  SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY CASES IN NATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEMS  
The development of superior responsibility cases in international human 
rights cases in U.S. and other national courts ran a parallel course to the 
developments in the international tribunals: the first cases focused on military 
superiority, and then expanded to civilian leaders and corporate officials. Because 
of its central role in human rights cases in U.S. courts, this Section begins with the 
case against General Yamashita for war crimes in Asia during World War II, which 
is commonly cited for the test of the superior-subordinate relationship as one of 
“effective control” and for the “knew or should have known” and “failed to take 
action” standards. The Section then examines the development of ATS and TVPA 
cases that were brought against military commanders, developing to civilian 
government and then private corporate officers under a theory of superior 
responsibility. This Section concludes by exploring parallel standards in U.S. 
corporate officer cases under statutes besides the ATS and TVPA, and then turns 
to compare standards in other national jurisdictions. 
                                                 
208  In the Case against N.T.V. Karma Mohamed Thasin Al Khavat, Case No. STL-14-05/T/CJ, Public 
Redacted Version of Judgment, ¶ 7 (Special Trib. For Lebanon, Sept. 18, 2015). 
209  Id. 
210  Id. (Ultimately, she was convicted only of contempt of court rather than the underlying crimes.). 
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A.  The United States:  The Yamashita  Case 
The Yamashita military commission ruling discussed above was appealed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.211 While controversial, the Supreme Court’s ruling 
endorsed important principles of superior responsibility that have been repeatedly 
cited by later courts and tribunals in human rights and humanitarian law cases.212 
One central point was the use of the “effective control” test in the Yamashita 
case; this test remains the core for the analysis between superior and subordinate 
that international tribunals and national courts rely on to this day.213 The majority 
also focused much of its opinion on the deterrence purpose of holding 
commanders responsible, stating that the goal of protecting the civilian population 
“would largely be defeated if the commander of an invading army could with 
impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection.”214 
A strong dissent by Justice Murphy disputed the majority’s conclusion that 
Yamashita had effective control over his subordinates.215 Justice Murphy focused 
on facts which indicated that Yamashita could not have known of the abuses, 
emphasizing his dismay that Yamashita did not have information because 
opposing forces had destroyed the communication system and describing the 
chaos of war created by allied forces.216 Notably, the bulk of Justice Murphy’s 
opinion focused on what he saw as due process violations of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment by the military commission.217 He also expressed 
his concern that the majority standard was not based on law in place at the time 
of the trial.218 Another dissent by Justice Rutledge addressed the lack of fair trial 
and criticized military commissions.219 However, neither dissenting Justice 
disregarded the principle of command responsibility, and Justice Murphy wrote 
                                                 
211  See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 1. 
212  Id. at 15. 
213  See Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Operations, 
164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 180 (2000). 
214  Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 15. 
215  See id. at 26–41 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
216  Id. 
217  See id. at 27–28 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting that defendant was “rushed to trial under an 
improper charge, given insufficient time to prepare an adequate defense, deprived of the benefits 
of some of the most elementary rules of evidence and summarily sentenced to be hanged”). 
218  See id. at 35 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in all history or in international law, at least as far as 
I am aware, justifies such a charge against a fallen commander of a defeated force.”). 
219 Id. at 41–81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
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that a military commander could be punished for “clear and unlawful failures to 
prevent atrocities.”220 
The Yamashita case continued to be a central part of U.S. courts’ analysis, 
and was applied in tort cases in the ATS and TVPA cases, described below. 
B.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 Cases Alleging International Human 
Rights Violations 
To understand how domestic tort law and international human rights law 
intersect for the examination of corporate officer liability, it is necessary to begin 
with a brief introduction to the statutes where the question arises. In U.S. courts, 
two of these statutes are the ATS and the TVPA. The development of the case 
law on superior responsibility for defendants under the ATS has broadened from 
military and civilian government commanders in the 1980s and 1990s to include 
non-governmental actors beginning in 1995.221 These cases have continued to the 
present, along with cases brought under the TVPA.222 A number of cases have 
been brought under both statutes, with some bringing additional federal and state 
statutory claims.223 
1. Legal framework for U.S. human rights cases. 
a) Alien Tort Statute 
The ATS is a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and provides jurisdiction 
over tort claims by aliens that are either violations of a treaty or of the “law of 
nations.”224 The inclusion of human rights violations as violations of the law of 
nations, known today as “customary international law,” was first analyzed by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala,225 and 
endorsed in numerous cases, including by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain.226 
As far back as at least the last century, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
customary international law “may be ascertained by consulting the works of 
                                                 
220  Id. at 40 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
221  See STEPHENS, CHOMSKY, GREEN, HOFFMAN, & RATNER, supra note 45, at 46, 311. 
222  For summaries of ongoing cases, see, for example, Center for Constitutional Rights, 
www.ccrjustice.org; EarthRights International, www.earthrightsinternational.org; Center for Justice 
and Accountability, www.cja.org; The Business and Human Rights Resource Center, 
www.business-humanrights.org. 
223  Id. 
224  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2016). 
225  See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876. 
226  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004). 
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jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of 
nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law.”227 In 2004, 
the Court endorsed this standard in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.228 The multiple sources 
of customary international law are also reflected in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice229 and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States,230 which include the standards enacted by international 
bodies, general practice, and judicial decisions.231 Oppenheim’s International Law 
further elaborates the sources of customary law to include external conduct 
between governments, domestic legislation, diplomatic dispatches, internal 
government memoranda, and ministerial statements.232 This means that the 
framework for accountability draws from international treaties, civil/tort, and 
criminal law. 
When examining a particular defendant’s responsibility for the alleged 
violations (or to use international terminology, the “mode of liability”), courts 
have come to different conclusions about whether they look to international law 
or federal common law. Since federal common law includes international law, 
customary international law standards are arguably relevant regardless of which 
theory is accepted.233 The split in opinion, however, is another reason that this 
Article examines the standards under both international law and U.S. federal law. 
Looking to federal common law has been criticized as being too open-
ended––inviting courts to use such a range of multiple sources of law including 
foreign jurisdictions makes it difficult to ascertain a definitive standard. 
Defendants in U.S. cases and scholars have sometimes argued that customary 
international law is subjective or in the eye of the beholder. However, this criticism 
                                                 
227  U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160–61 (1820). 
228  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
229  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, Jun 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, U.S.T.S. 993, 
quoted in Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 & n. 8. 
230  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 701, Reporters’ 
Notes 2 (1987) (“[1] [V]irtually universal participation of states in the preparation and adoption of 
international agreements recognizing human rights principles generally, or particular rights; the 
adoption of human rights principles by states and in regional organizations in Europe, Latin 
America, and Africa; [3] general support by states for United Nations resolutions declaring, 
recognizing, invoking, and applying international human rights principles as international law; [4] 
action by States to conform their national law or practice to standards or principles declared by 
international bodies . . . [and] [5] invocation of human rights principles in national policy, in 
diplomatic practice, in international organization activities and actions[,] and other diplomatic 
communications.”). 
231  See also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984). 
232  Id. 
233  Id. at 1561–62. 
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does not apply when there is a common analysis across multiple sources or a 
consistent definition over time. In the case of superior responsibility, there is a 
common core in the elements applied in both criminal and civil human rights 
cases. Another common denominator is that the doctrine can apply to those with 
military, civilian governmental, or private status. 
b) The Torture Victim Protection Act 
The TVPA, which provides jurisdiction over claims by individual defendants 
for torture and summary execution, has led to far fewer questions about the source 
of law defining superior responsibility. The TVPA legislative history explicitly 
refers to the command responsibility doctrine “under international law,”234 and 
thus where plaintiffs have alleged under the TVPA that a defendant has command 
responsibility, courts examining whether plaintiffs have properly pled their claims 
look to the definitions as established by customary international law.  
While the legislative history uses the term “command responsibility,” it does 
not limit the application of this form of liability to military commanders and sets 
forth the following parameters: “a higher official need not have personally 
performed or ordered the abuses in order to be held liable”235 and “responsibility 
for torture, summary execution, or disappearances extends beyond the person or 
persons who actually committed those acts––anyone with higher authority who 
authorized, tolerated or knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them.”236 
Plaintiffs may bring evidence of “a pervasive pattern and practice of torture, 
summary execution or disappearances.”237 
The Senate report cited the opinion of the Tokyo War Crimes tribunal in the 
Yamashita case, explaining the application of command responsibility: when 
“crimes are notorious, numerous and widespread as to time and place are matters 
to be considered in imputing knowledge.’”238 Underscoring the endorsement of 
ATS jurisprudence, the Senate report cited a 1980s ATS case, Forti v. Suarez Mason, 
as an example of liability where an official was liable for the actions of “personnel 
under his command ‘acting pursuant to a “policy, pattern and practice” of the 
First Army Corps.’”239 
                                                 
234  S. REP. NO. 102–249, at 9 (1991). 
235  Id. 
236  Id. (citing United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment art. 4, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 3, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1985, 
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238  Id. at 9 & n. 18 (quoting the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, reprinted in 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1029, 1039 (L. Friedman ed., 1972)). 
239  Id. at 9 (citing Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1537–38 (N.D. Cal. 1987)). 
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After the passage of the 1992 TVPA, many of the human rights cases 
brought under the ATS included TVPA claims, and the courts used common 
standards to assess superior responsibility for claims brought under the two 
statutes. 
2. ATS and TVPA jurisprudence on the legal standard for 
superior responsibility. 
The development of superior responsibility cases in international human 
rights cases in U.S. courts followed the pattern of the international tribunal cases, 
progressing from military command responsibility to the inclusion of civilian 
government officials. 
Since the 1980s, judges have ruled that defendants could be liable under the 
theory of command responsibility in cases brought in U.S. courts under the ATS. 
The initial cases brought against military commanders applied the legal standard 
for command responsibility as developed in the Yamashita case as well as more 
recent developments in international law. The courts have wrestled with the types 
of acts for which a defendant can be found to have superior responsibility, and 
the collection of rulings provide a consistent, solid standard. 
The first ATS case in which a court analyzed command responsibility was 
brought against Argentinian General Suarez-Mason, alleged to be responsible for 
disappearances and extrajudicial executions during Argentina’s “Dirty War.”240 
The court held that Suarez-Mason’s superior responsibility was based on his 
position of authority and because he “authorized, approved, directed, and ratified” 
human rights violations,241 he was held responsible for actions that were part of a 
“policy, pattern and practice” that he had endorsed.242 
Cases continue to be brought against military leaders, and an important set 
of cases against a Salvadoran general are two commonly-cited cases in ATS 
jurisprudence.243 The 2002 Eleventh Circuit decision Ford v. Garcia244 began with 
an analysis of In re Yamashita, and then turned to the opinions on superior 
responsibility by the international tribunals of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, 
concluding that these decisions “provide insight into how the doctrine should be 
                                                 
240  See Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1531. 
241  Id. at 1538. 
242  Id. at 1537 (quotation marks omitted). 
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applied in TVPA cases.”245 The Ford court cited ICTY and ICTR decisions on the 
effective control test as including the elements of 1) a superior-subordinate 
relationship, 2) the superior knew or should have known, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, that his or her subordinates had committed, were 
committing, or planned to commit acts which violated the law of war, and 3) the 
superior failed to prevent the commission of the crimes or failed to punish the 
subordinates after the commission of the crimes.246 In Ford, the jury acquitted the 
defendants, and plaintiffs appealed based on what have been criticized as 
erroneous jury instructions. The instructions shifted the burden to prove that 
defendants had effective control and had established the elements of command 
responsibility “by a preponderance of the evidence” that their “injuries were a 
direct or a reasonably foreseeable consequence of one or both defendants' failure 
to fulfill their obligations under the doctrine of command responsibility.”247 In a 
second related case, Romagoza v. Garcia, the jury convicted the same defendants 
and issued a $50 million verdict.248 In addition to the rulings on the legal standard 
for command responsibility, these two cases have also highlighted the questions 
of the necessary evidence and burden of proof for superior responsibility. The 
Romagoza jury instructions returned to standards familiar under international law 
and stated that the plaintiff must prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” that 
the defendant/military commander had the actual ability to control the person(s) 
accused of torturing the plaintiff.249 The first element of superior responsibility 
there was “effective control.” 
A subsequent case, Chavez v. Carranza, also found the burden on the plaintiff 
to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, the elements of superior 
responsibility: “effective control” over the physical perpetrator(s) of torture, 
extrajudicial killing and/or crimes against humanity.250 The Carranza jury 
instructions defined the “effective control requirement” as requiring that “the 
defendant had legal authority and practical ability to exert control over his 
subordinates.”251 The Carranza jury instructions also stated that defendants could 
not do an end run around liability: “The defendant cannot escape liability however 
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246  Id. at 1290–91 (citing Delalic, Aleksovski, Blaskic, Kayishema, and Akayesu ICTY and ICTR 
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where his own action or inaction caused or significantly contributed to a lack of 
effective control over his subordinates.”252 
Thus, for military leaders, ATS and TVPA cases have focused on the 
“effective control” test. The same test was also applied to paramilitary leaders. For 
example, in a case against Emmanuel Constant, the 1990s paramilitary leader in 
Haiti, Constant was held responsible for a campaign of rape and other abuses 
against those supporting the government Constant opposed; Constant was held 
liable for crimes against humanity and torture.253 
Superior responsibility was also applied to civilian government officials, 
beginning in a series of ATS cases against Ferdinand Marcos, the former dictator 
of the Philippines.254 Marcos was held responsible for the actions of his 
subordinates. The question of whether Marcos could be held responsible for acts 
“merely” under his command came before the Ninth Circuit. He established a 
policy encouraging the repression of political activists, created a disciplinary 
structure that contributed to the patterns of abuse and a climate of impunity, and 
rewarded those who perpetrated atrocities.255 The jury instructions for the Marcos 
trial stated that the test to be applied was whether Marcos “had knowledge that 
the Philippine military, paramilitary and/or intelligence forces tortured, summarily 
executed, caused the disappearance or arbitrary detention of plaintiffs and the 
class, and having the power failed to take effective measures to prevent the 
practice.”256 While the Marcos jury instructions use “knowledge” rather than 
“knew or had reason to know,” this was the result of negotiation between the 
parties rather than a judicial determination on the content of customary 
international law.257 These jury instructions did not address superior responsibility 
by omission.258 
A 2004 case against another civilian official, Liu Qi, the mayor of Beijing, for 
human rights violations committed against Falun Gong practitioners, provided an 
analysis of plaintiffs’ allegations of superior responsibility that discussed the 
widening net for liability for supervisory authority and the legal test applied in U.S. 
and international courts.259 The Liu Qi court held that a superior-subordinate 
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relationship was established where one defendant had supervisory authority over 
the perpetrators, and another defendant “played a major policy-making and 
supervisory role in the policies and practices that were carried out.”260 The court 
also extensively discussed the legislative history of the Torture Victim Protection 
Act, and noted that text and history of TVPA indicated that it was not limited to 
military officials.261 The court held that the “Senate thus implicitly endorsed the 
application of command responsibility to acts of torture and extrajudicial killings 
whether committed by military or civilian forces. . . . [T]he text of the TVPA does 
not limit its applicability to acts of military officials or the context of war.”262  
The consistent standard developed in the line of ATS and TVPA cases, 
which applied to military, paramilitary, and civilian governmental officials, 
included clear common elements: superior-subordinate relationship of effective 
control (not limited by a particular status such as military or civilian government 
position), knowledge or duty to know, power to take action, and failure to do so. 
These elements are consistent with the standards endorsed by the international 
tribunals, as discussed above. 
3. ATS/TVPA cases against non-state-actors-the shift in the 1990s. 
Between 1980 and 1995, all substantial rulings in cases brought under the 
ATS and the TVPA addressed the liability of state actors—predominantly former 
government officials of foreign nations. As for many other aspects of the question 
of corporate accountability in ATS cases in U.S. courts, the opinion bridging cases 
brought against state officials and those brought against non-state actors was the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Kadic v. Karadzic.263 
In 1993, two cases alleging genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity were brought against Radovan Karadzic, the self-declared president of 
“Republika Srpska,” a section of the territory of the former Yugoslavia that was 
not recognized as a State by the international legal system.264 As the self-
proclaimed head of an unrecognized State, Karadzic was a “non-state actor,” and 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York initially dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ claims because it held international human rights obligations only 
applied to those operating under official government authority or “state actors.”265 
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit analyzed the 
question of whether state action was a necessary element to hold human rights 
violators accountable under the ATS and the TVPA.266 The court found that it 
depended on the definition of the norm under international law—some violations 
such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity did not require state 
action as an element of the violation, and others such as torture and arbitrary 
detention did.267 The court found that Karadzic had command responsibility for 
both the violations that did not require state action under international law and 
those that did.268 
The case making the link between “non-state actors” and multinational 
corporations was a 1997 decision in Doe v. Unocal Corp., in which the U.S. District 
Court for the Central District of California applied the Second Circuit’s analysis 
in Karadzic to a case alleging complicity in forced labor and other human rights 
abuses in Burma against the Unocal Corporation, its joint venture partners, and 
two Unocal officers: President John Imle and Chief Executive Officer Roger 
Beach.269 There were no final rulings on liability in these cases because the case 
settled in the midst of summary judgment proceedings in federal court and before 
the liability phase of the trial began in state court.270 The court did not address 
superior liability but rather focused on the role of the corporation itself in the 
violations and plaintiffs’ allegations that the corporation and its officers aided and 
abetted in the liability.271 On these issues, the role of the President and CEO were 
key to the finding of the ruling to allow the case past summary judgment.272 
In an ATS case on the Bhopal toxic gas disaster, Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 
the court found the potential of corporate superior officer liability, but applied 
New York rather than international law: “Under New York law, ‘a corporate 
officer who commits or participates in a tort, even if it is in the course of his duties 
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on behalf of the corporation, may be held individually liable.’”273 The court then 
found that “the amended complaint asserts that Anderson exercised significant 
direct control over management of the Bhopal plant, including control over safety 
procedures.”274 The court then remanded for further consideration of the claims 
against Anderson. The applicability of these standards to Anderson was never 
addressed because the case was dismissed on unrelated grounds.275 
A 2002 ruling also examined U.S. domestic standards for corporate officer 
liability, and this time compared them to international law standards and found 
them consistent. In Wiwa v. Brian Anderson, an unpublished decision of the 
Southern District of New York examined the history of the TVPA and held that 
the former Managing Director of Shell Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria could be liable on multiple forms of complicity, because the plain meaning 
of the TVPA provides for cases against those who “cause someone to undergo” 
torture or extrajudicial killing, as well as those who actually carry out the physical 
acts.276 
Another case against Shell, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, landed in the 
Supreme Court.277 At an earlier stage of the case, a little-known piece of this 
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concerned corporate 
officer liability.278 Despite the majority’s strenuous objection to corporate entity 
liability, they endorsed corporate officer liability in the context of aiding and 
abetting allegations in that case, noting that “nothing in this opinion limits or 
forecloses suits under the ATS against the individual perpetrators of violations of 
customary international law—including the employees, managers, officers, and 
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directors of a corporation—as well as anyone who purposefully aids and abets a 
violation of customary international law.”279 
However, when it reviewed the Second Circuit’s Kiobel decision, the Supreme 
Court did not address the question of corporate institutional or officer liability. 
Instead, the Court ordered reargument on the question of “whether and under 
what circumstances” the ATS applies to violations of the law of nations occurring 
outside U.S. territory.”280 After briefing and argument, the majority concluded that 
the ATS cases must “touch and concern” U.S. territory “with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”281 
In another case that reached the Supreme Court, Mohamad v. Palestinian 
Authority, the Court held that the TVPA’s use of the term “individual” to describe 
defendants excluded corporations and other entities.282 Corporate officers may be 
sued under this statute, including, for example, in a case against the Chiquita 
corporation for superior responsibility, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy.283 On 
June 2, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled 
that corporate officers may be sued under TVPA for aiding and abetting, and 
conspiracy; the court did not reach superior responsibility.284 
4. Drummond: the first challenge to superior liability for corporate 
officers in an ATS/TVPA case. 
Besides the Kiobel case discussed above, the only other circuit to address the 
question of superior responsibility for corporate officers is the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in a series of cases against the Drummond 
Corporation. In contrast to the indirect reference by the Second Circuit in Kiobel, 
the Eleventh Circuit directly addressed the question. 
Beginning in 2003 and 2004, a series of four cases was brought under the 
ATS, TVPA, and the Colombian wrongful death law against the Drummond 
Corporation, two Drummond subsidiary corporations, and executives Augusto 
Jimenez, Garry Drummond, and James Michael Tracy.285 At the trial court level in 
                                                 
279  Id. 
280  Kiobel, order for reargument, https://perma.cc/Y4V4-CB5H. 
281  Kiobel supra note 2. 
282  Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012). This ruling ignored multiple uses of the term 
“person” in the legislative history and the use in international law of individual to include both 
human beings and legal entities. 
283 In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., No. 08-MD-01916-KAM, 2016 WL 3247913 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 
2016). 
284  Id. 
285  Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008); Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond 
Co., 640 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2011); Giraldo v. Drummond Co. Inc., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 
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Giraldo v. Drummond, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alabama initially 
held that there was no superior liability for corporate officers. The claims in the 
case were brought by wives, parents, and children of people killed by a Colombian 
paramilitary organization who sued the Alabama-based coal company and officers 
for complicity with the paramilitary organization AUC (United Self Defense 
Forces), an organization that was designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. 
State Department. The plaintiffs alleged that between 1996 and 2006, Augusto 
Jimenez, the President of Drummond, Ltd (DLTD)’s Colombian branch, 
supervised the development and implementation of Drummond security plans. 
The allegations stated that Jimenez was responsible for monitoring contractors 
and for causing an investigation to occur on allegation of any Drummond 
employee assisting paramilitaries; he was also charged with paying and conspiring 
with the AUC in the killings.286 
In opposing the allegations of the complaint, Jimenez did not challenge the 
superior responsibility theory, but instead questioned whether plaintiffs had 
properly pled the claim. The second officer sued was Mike Tracy, who had been 
the DLTD president between 1992 and 1998. Plaintiffs charged that he formed 
and implemented Drummond Limited’s security policies, made decisions to 
provide funds to Colombian military without restrictions, and allowed the military 
to use funds to contribute to the AUC.287 
The district court rejected superior responsibility for these corporate officers 
because it held that the allegations were insufficient to implicate the defendants.288 
The court then made the sweeping statement that “no court, in any jurisdiction, 
has ever extended the doctrine of superior responsibility in ATS and/or TVPA 
cases to the corporate officers of private companies. That is because command 
responsibility is a military doctrine.”289 The court continued, “The theory has only 
                                                 
WL 3873960, at *2 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013), aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Drummond Co. Inc., 782 F.3d 
576 (11th Cir. 2015); Melo Penaloza v. Drummond Co., 2016 WL 5389280 (11th Cir. 2016). 
286  Giraldo, 2013 WL 3873960, at *2, aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Drummond Co. Inc., 782 F.3d 576 (11th 
Cir. 2015). 
287  Doe, 782 F.3d at 576. At a late stage the plaintiffs tried to add Garry Drummond and this motion 
was denied as untimely. See Giraldo, 2013 WL 3873960, at *3 & n. 2. Garry Drummond was later 
included in Melo v. Drummond. That case was recently reinstated by the Eleventh Circuit. Melo, 
v. Drummond, No. 16-10921, 11th Cir. (Sept. 27, 2016). 
288  Giraldo, 2013 WL 3873978, at *4, aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 
2015). 
289  Giraldo, 2013 WL 3873978, at *4, aff'd sub nom (citing Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th 
Cir. 2002); Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 499 (6th Cir. 2009); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 
IT-96-21-A, Judgment (ICTY Feb. 20, 2001); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, 
Judgment and Sentence (Jan. 27, 2000)). 
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been extended to civilians where those individuals had authoritative control over 
state-run military or public forces.”290 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the 
dismissal of the case against the corporate officers because it found that plaintiffs 
had not pled sufficient facts linking the individual defendants to the alleged 
violations.291 However, most significant for this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected the district court’s legal analysis and found international agreement on the 
superior responsibility standard for corporate officers.292 The Eleventh Circuit 
stated, “[t]here is extensive support from international law and in the text, 
legislative history, and jurisprudence of the TVPA for civilian liability under the 
command responsibility doctrine.”293 The appellate court affirmed the common 
elements of the standard: “Thus, a civilian superior—including a civilian corporate 
officer—could feasibly be held liable under the doctrine provided the plaintiffs 
demonstrated a superior-subordinate relationship between the civilian and the 
perpetrator, averring that the civilian was in the requisite position of authority and 
control.”294 The Eleventh Circuit also held that plaintiffs are required to prove 
“that the superior has effective control over the persons committing the 
violations . . . that is, has the material ability to prevent the crimes and to punish 
the perpetrators thereof.”295 
In Melo v. Drummond, the last of this series of cases, the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss the TVPA and Colombian law allegations 
against corporate officers and remanded the case for further consideration by the 
district court.296 
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling on superior responsibility provides an 
important standard that future plaintiffs may follow. 
5. The current state of the ATS and TVPA cases. 
The end result of the twenty-plus years of cases in which courts ruled on the 
question of superior responsibility is a body of jurisprudence that has only begun 
                                                 
290  Giraldo, 2013 WL 3873978, at *4, aff'd sub nom (citing Doe v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1329–30 
(N.D. Cal. 2004)). 
291  Doe v. Drummond, 782 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1168 (2016). 
292  Id. 
293  Id. at 609 & n. 46 (“[S]ince the doctrine is adopted from international law we turn thereto for 
guidance; both criminal and civil cases from international law may be persuasive.”); Ford, 289 F.3d 
at 1289 & n. 6 (using criminal cases to interpret the doctrine in the absence of congressional intent 
for “courts to draw any distinction in their application of command responsibility in the civil 
arena”). 
294  Doe v. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 610 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original). 
295  Id. (citing Ford, 289 F.3d at 1291, 1298). 
296  Melo Penaloza v. Drummond Co., No. 16-10921, 11th Cir. (Sept. 27, 2016). 
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its application to corporate officers. The law has progressed from decisions on 
military and civilian government officials, and one circuit has recognized superior 
officer liability for corporate officials. The standards used in these decisions 
contribute to an international body of law imposing liability on superior officers, 
regardless of whether they are a state or non-state actor. 
C. Superior Responsibi l ity Standards under Federal Common 
Law and Analogous Torts in U.S. Domestic Law  
This Section lays out the principles of superior liability under U.S. law 
focused on other areas besides international human rights. Contrary to a challenge 
that the application of international law subjects corporate officers to liability that 
does not exist under U.S. domestic law, comparable U.S. domestic tort law applies 
liability standards that are, if anything, stricter than those applied in international 
law. While there is some variation between jurisdictions, the common underlying 
principle holds corporate officers responsible for individual tortious conduct. 
Particular examples with parallel public interest concerns to human rights cases 
are trade practices, environmental harm, and health safety under laws such as 
those regulating the environment and product safety. 
1. General principles of tort liability for corporate officers under 
U.S. law. 
Tort liability arises where there is a personal duty owed by the director or 
officer.297 Traditional doctrine provides that an officer is liable where he or she 
directs actions, participates or cooperates in an act, or has particular 
responsibilities.298 In the context of duties by officers to third parties, courts have 
recognized that such a duty might arise where there is direct or foreseeable contact 
with the third party, including where the corporation has delegated this duty to 
the officer.299 Omissions and commissions may create tort liability, but corporate 
officers are not generally liable merely because of their position in the 
corporation.300 Statutory exceptions are discussed in the next section. 
Corporate officers can be personally liable to non-shareholder third parties 
based on inadequate management or failure to supervise subordinates, including 
                                                 
297  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 343–
44 (1957). 
298  3A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 1137 (2016). 
299  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (2006) (individual personally liable for torts, 
including where acted as agent or under direction of another). 
300  WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 
§§ 6.07[1], 6–24 (8th ed., 2013). 
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“failure to stop misconduct they ought to know about.”301 Cases against directors 
and officers have been brought for decades for mass torts and products liability. 
For supervision and management torts committed against third parties, the 
majority of courts operate under a simple negligence standard.302 
The Restatement (Second) on Torts (1965), section 402A defines the 
manufacturer’s duty to encompass when “he has knowledge, or by the application 
of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge” of 
possible harm through the use of the product.303 The duty to supervise is common 
in medical liability jurisprudence.304 Similar to the international law concept of 
“effective control,” U.S. supervisory responsibility is limited to when an individual 
is legally obliged to exercise control over a subordinate.305 
Theories of liability include a focus on a superior officer’s participation in a 
tort, whether there was a breach of a duty, or a court pierces the corporate veil. 306 
The first category includes cases in which a superior officer has “constructive 
knowledge of a tort” or “reasonably should have known that some hazardous 
condition or activity under their control could injure [a third party, but] they 
negligently failed to take or order appropriate action to avoid the harm.”307 A duty 
can be delegated by a corporation to a director or officer and then breached by 
officer conduct which causes injury to a third party; this liability can result from 
omissions such as failure to stop conduct the officer ought to know about.308 Such 
duties to third parties, or “external” duties stem in part from “moral hazard” 
considerations—the risk of personal liability deters misconduct.309 
                                                 
301  Id. See also Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability for Supervision and 
Management: Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1661, 1662 & n. 1 
(2010) (defining officer as a corporation’s president, financial officer, chief accounting officers, vice 
presidents of principal business units and any person with significant “policy-making functions”; 
roughly tracking definition in Rules and Regulation Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.16a-1). 
302  A minority of states, such as North Carolina, require gross negligence. Shareholder actions and 
other claims around fiduciary duties (internal duties of the officer to the corporation) have 
protections for officers such as the business judgment rule. 
303  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Cmt. j (1965). While the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (2010) may have broadened the scope 
of duty to exercise reasonable care, the law is as yet undefined.  
304  W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORT 383–
85, 914–15 (5th ed., 1984). 
305  Id. at 384.  
306  Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). 
307  Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Ass’n, 723 P.2d 573, 584 (Cal. 1986). 
308  KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 300, at § 6.07, 6–23. 
309  See, for example, KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 212–219 (1976). 
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The common law tort of negligent supervision has some variation across 
state jurisdictions. Courts have varied in their focuses on participation in the 
tortious conduct, breach of a personal duty, or whether they treat supervision 
claims as separate from other tort liability.310 
The tort of negligent supervision is most used where there is a pattern and 
the officer “had the opportunity to discover the wrongful acts,”311 or where they 
are “negligent in failing to learn of and prevent torts by employees.”312 Courts 
have held that officers were potentially liable for lack of reasonable diligence in 
the control and supervision of a business which resulted in a death caused by a 
warehouse explosion313 or a death resulting from failure to properly train a 
machine operator or company officers who decreased security measures to 
increase profits could be personally liable to a customer shot at a shopping mall.314 
An officer has a common law duty not to injure third parties.315 “[A] director 
could inflict injuries upon others and then escape liability behind the shield of his 
or her representative character, even though the corporation might be insolvent 
or irresponsible.”316 As mentioned above, in one ATS case, the court referenced 
U.S. domestic standards.317 In Bano v. Union Carbide, the Second Circuit stated, 
“Under New York law, ‘a corporate officer who commits or participates in a tort, 
even if it is in the course of his duties on behalf of the corporation may be held 
individually liable.’”318 
The general standards of tort liability for corporate superior officers under 
U.S. law, which include negligence, would in fact allow a greater range of claims 
than the criminal international law standards. The next Section turns to one 
specific application of the responsibility of superior officers, the Responsible 
Corporate Officer Doctrine. 
                                                 
310  Petrin, supra note 301, at 1676 & n. 79–80 (citing cases from VT, MO, NY, PA, WV). 
311  Id. at 1678 (citing Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 50 N.E.2d 602, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943); Air Traffic 
Conference of Am. V. Marina Travel, Inc., 316 S.E.2d 642, 645 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)). 
312  Id. at 1678 (citing Avery v. Solargizer Int'l, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); 
Preston-Thomas Const., Inc. v. Cent. Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973)). 
313  Cameron v. Kenyon-Connel Commercial Co., 56 P. 358, 361 (Mont. 1899); but see Moak v. Link-
Belt Co., 242 So. 2d 515 (La. 1970) (no negligence so no liability). 
314  Haire v. Bonelli, 870 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2008). 
315  Frances T., 723 P.2d at 581–82 (intentional conduct will result in personal liability; joint liability 
when corporate officer participates with corporation). 
316  Id. at 581. 
317  Bano v. Union Carbide, 273 F.3d 120, 133 (2d Cir. 2001). 
318  Id. (citing Lopresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 42 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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2. Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine. 
The Responsible Corporate Officer (RCO) doctrine provides liability for an 
officer as well as a corporation if the officer participates in wrongful conduct or 
knowingly approves that conduct.319 If there are joint participants they can each 
be held liable. RCO liability requires the following elements to hold an officer 
liable: (1) the officer’s position must allow influence on corporate policies or 
activities, (2) there must have been a nexus between the officer and the violation, 
and (3) the defendant’s actions or inactions facilitated the violations.320 
The doctrine was initially developed for “public welfare” statutes, and now 
includes statutes such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.321 The common understanding is 
that these are “public welfare statutes” enacted to prevent harm to the general 
public. In seeking to maximize deterrence, these statutes have turned to individual 
corporate officer liability.322 The similarity in both the types of actions, and the 
shared goal of deterrence, points to these statutes as important for comparison 
with human rights cases. 
The RCO doctrine is not new––it developed in the 1920s, based on English 
cases from the nineteenth century.323 In United States v. Dotterweich,324 the president 
of a pharmaceutical company was criminally convicted for shipping misbranded 
and adulterated drugs in interstate commerce. The court held that all those who 
had a “responsible share” in the conduct could be held liable for corporate 
                                                 
319  3A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 1135. 
320  Marco Quazzo, Officers and Directors Face Personal Liability under the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 
11 CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (BNA) 841 (Aug. 9, 2013) (RCO doctrine applied in civil cases); 
Petrin, supra note 301, at 1675; Tom McMahon & Katie Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate 
Law Doctrines in Environmental Cases, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 29, 29–31 (1988); Lynda J. Oswald 
& Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the “Erosion” of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 259, 329–30 (1992) (general principles of corporate law doctrine for CERCLA violations). 
321  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1970); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1972); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 
(2016); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 301–399d (2011); Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 1–7 (2011). 
322  Noël Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the Responsible 
Corporate Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases, 21 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 283 (2002). 
323  Id. at 298. 
324  U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 283–84 (1943). 
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violations of the law.325 The court required “foresight” and “vigilance” that 
“individuals who executed the corporate mission” would implement measures to 
prevent violations.326 Justice Frankfurter’s opinion stated that the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act “dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal 
conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it 
puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing 
in responsible relation to a public danger.”327 
In 1975, in United States v. Park,328 a chief executive officer was held 
responsible for a national grocery chain’s food storage conditions that violated 
federal law: “individuals who execute the corporate mission” have a “positive duty 
to seek out and remedy violations of [the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act] 
when they occur” and “a duty to implement measures that will insure that 
violations will not occur.”329 The public has a “right to expect [foresight and 
vigilance] of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business 
enterprises whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the 
public that supports them.”330 
In what has been labeled a “resurgence” of the RCO doctrine, in 2007, the 
Department of Justice brought charges against three officers for the misbranding 
and fraudulent marketing of OxyContin.331 The executives pled guilty to 
misdemeanors and agreed to pay $634,525,475 in fines.332 In another important 
deterrent, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) debarred the three 
executives from participation in federal healthcare programs for 12 years,333 and 
the exclusion was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia.334 A 2009 case against four executives of a medical device manufacturer 
resulted in prison terms and $100,000 in fines.335 
                                                 
325  Id. at 284. 
326  U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975). 
327  Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922)). 
328  Park, 421 U.S. at 658. 
329  Id. at 672. 
330  Id. 
331  Thomas J. Mortell & Michelle Gustavson, The Resurgence of the Corporate Officer Doctrine, 55 ADVOCATE 
32 (2012) (citing United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 573 (W.D. Va. 
2007)). 
332  Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Milliion, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2007) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html. 
333  Mortell & Gustavson, supra note 332, at 33. 
334  Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (remanded for reconsideration of length of 
exclusion). 
335  United States v. Norian Corp., No. 09-cr-403-LDD (E.D. Pa. 2009), Sentencing Nov. 21, 2011. 
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The RCO doctrine was first applied in a civil case in 1985. In United States v. 
Hodges X-Ray,336 defendants attempted to distinguish prior decisions on criminal 
liability, but the court rejected those arguments, saying that “the rationale for 
holding corporate officers criminally responsible for acts of the corporation, 
which could lead to incarceration, is even more persuasive where only civil liability 
is involved.”337 In the 1990s, the doctrine was used for civil penalties in cases on 
a wide range of environmental statutes, including CERCLA, the Clean Air Act, 
and the Federal Hazardous Substances Act.338 
The RCO doctrine has been labeled a strict liability standard.339 “The primary 
unique feature of the responsible corporate officer doctrine is that it does not 
matter that such officer did not participate in or have knowledge of the alleged 
violation.”340 One of the important bases of the doctrine is that personal liability 
promotes responsible conduct.341 The arguments against applying the RCO strict 
liability standard include that holding a superior responsible for genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, or other serious human rights violations 
leads to more severe punishment than RCO cases, reputational harm, and for acts 
sucas genocide, include elements such as specific intent.342 An argument in favor 
of applying such a standard to human rights violations is that a strict liability 
standard would demonstrate a zero-tolerance policy, and that human rights 
violations should be treated as violations of the same level of severity as the 
conduct regulated by U.S. public welfare statutes.  
There is also an argument that the critique of unfair responsibilities is less 
applicable in the corporate context than it is for those in government service. 
Where a corporate officer has power and responsibility and when the end goal is 
the creation of profits, the situation is arguably different from the assumption of 
power in a military position or to serve a civilian government.343 Another 
                                                 
336  United States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 1985). 
337  Id. 
338  Wise, supra note 322, at 313. 
339  Wu & Kang, supra note 9. 
340  Kai Peters, The Corporate Responsibility Doctrine: Handling Matters When Corporate Executives Are Involved 
in Criminal or Civil Matters, in PROTECTING CORPORATIONS AGAINST MANAGEMENT LIABILITY 
CLAIMS: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS, 
INVESTIGATING AND RESPONDING TO ALLEGATIONS, AND CREATING EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE 
STRATEGIES 7 (2013). See also Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284; Park, 421 U.S. at 670–72 (all those who 
had a “responsible share” in conduct could be held liable for corporate violations of the law). 
341  Wise, supra note 322, at 340. 
342  Wu & Kang, supra note 9, at 281. 
343  Id. at n. 39 (“[T]here is a sense in which the superior has not assumed the risks in the same way that 
a corporate officer has, because he is not involved in an intrinsically profit-making enterprise. The 
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important distinction is the difference between the consequences of a criminal 
conviction and a tort verdict against a corporate superior officer. Further, liability 
is limited by what is feasible, notably by the “objective impossibility defense”: a 
defendant may claim that he or she was “powerless to prevent or correct a 
violation.”344 The defendant’s duty “does not require that which is objectively 
impossible,” although it does require the highest standard of foresight and 
vigilance.345 
The standards in U.S. tort law for superior officer liability track with the 
standards under international law. One comparable doctrine, the Responsible 
Officer Doctrine, may in fact have a higher standard of liability than has been 
imposed by any of the international tribunals to date. 
D.  Examples from Other National Jurisdictions  
This Section illustrates that the development of the doctrine of superior 
responsibility liability is not limited to U.S. law. Legal systems around the world 
have recognized superior responsibility liability and a duty of care for corporate 
officers, although, similar to the U.S., these legal provisions have rarely been used 
to apply to human rights allegations against corporate officers. This Section 
highlights some examples of different types of legal provisions and cases applying 
these laws. 
Parallel to the discussion of the developments in the international criminal 
tribunals, an important starting point in the assessment of national legal systems 
is an important study by the ICRC, considered one of the authoritative interpretive 
agencies of humanitarian law. The ICRC assessed legal systems around the world 
as they addressed violations in the context of armed conflicts. This exhaustive 
study made clear that superior responsibility is applicable to both civilian and 
military leaders who fail to take “necessary and reasonable measures in their 
power” to prevent or punish subordinates.346 There is no requirement that the 
source of their authority be military or governmental.347 
                                                 
raison d’être of organizations such as the army, the civil service and the government is not primarily 
financial gain, although agents of these organizations do receive compensation for their work. 
Therefore, if the moral force of the assumption of risk argument is that agents must bear 
responsibility for activities that they initiate for personal gain, then it is attenuated with respect to 
command responsibility.”). 
344  Id. at 296. 
345  Id. (quoting U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975)). 
346  Customary Law, 87 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 211 (2005), https://perma.cc/VN8E-7RQJ; INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L., Practice Relating to Rule 151, 
Individual Responsibility, Section B. Individual Civil Liability, https://perma.cc/B8AW-SSQM. 
347  Id. 
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Systems of tort law do vary, reflecting “the different ideas, attitudes, trust, 
and beliefs that people in society hold with regard to litigation, institutions and 
social relationships in general.”348 George Fletcher concludes that all western 
industrialized systems break down tort systems into intentional torts, negligence, 
and strict liability.349 The “traditional view” of duty-creating provisions for 
corporate officers “inflicts liability on directors and senior officers if the 
corporation acted wrongfully and/or inflicted harm on their watch.”350 
All jurisdictions include remedial mechanisms for violations of “life, liberty, 
dignity, and physical and mental integrity.”351 Most if not all legal systems include 
some form of explicit tort law (or delicts); none exempts corporate conduct as a 
category from superior liability.352 In countries around the world, corporate 
officers can be criminally prosecuted and victims are provided compensation for 
wrongs by corporate officers. These legal actions also allow the submission of 
evidence of customary international law. In some jurisdictions, it is less common 
to impose liability on a corporate officer, instead holding the entity itself liable. 
As discussed above, the means of incorporation varies, but there remains a 
core of commonality across jurisdictions. General categories of types of 
implementation are direct provision in law; one example is Belgian law, which 
allows tort remedies for Belgian residents.353 Some states incorporate international 
law through constitutional torts.354 In numerous European countries, bringing 
                                                 
348  Mauro Bussani & Marta Infantino, The Many Cultures of Tort Liability, in COMPARATIVE TORT LAW: 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 13 (Mauro Bussani & Anthony J. Sebok eds., 2015). 
349  GEORGE P. FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 53–54 (2008). 
350  Harry Glasbeek, Looking for Responsibility in the Corporate World, in DIRECTORS’ PERSONAL LIABILITY 
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351  International Commission of Jurists, Report of the Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in 
International Crimes: Volume 3 (Civil Remedies) 4 (2008), https://perma.cc/Q94M-FPZY 
[hereinafter ICJ Report]. 
352  Jennifer Zerk, Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses: Towards a Fairer and More Effective 
System of Domestic Law Remedies: A Report Prepared for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2014), 
https://perma.cc/3ZSS-EDPD. Some countries, such as Germany, do not allow corporate 
institutional liability. 
353  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L., Belgium: Practice Relating to 
Rule 157: Jurisdiction over War Crimes, https://perma.cc/6UYY-5LMR. 
354  See, for example, 1 CHRISTIAN VON BAR, THE COMMON EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS 553–97 (1998); 
ICJ Report, supra note 353, at 7–8 & n. 12 (citing laws from Argentina, Brazil, Ireland, and Nigeria 
for broad provisions). 
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human rights principles into private law is described as the “indirect third party 
effect:”355 The public laws have indirect persuasive authority, create the general 
framework, and are intended to be enforceable by private persons against other 
private persons.356 Another common model is for the law of tort and non-
contractual obligations to be the primary bases for civil claims.357 In yet another 
model, compensation and other remedies for victims are linked to criminal codes, 
as in Spain, France (action civile),358 and the People’s Republic of China.359 
One recent study found that “[i]n the majority of jurisdictions, despite 
differences in terminology, for the purposes of civil liability an actor will often be 
considered to have acted intentionally if it voluntarily undertook a course of 
conduct knowing that it was more than likely to result in harm.”360 Common 
elements leading to liability are that a defendant knew or had reason to know 
about risk361 and that the defendant failed to prevent the harm from occurring.362 
This can include omissions, remaining silent, or failure to take precautionary 
measures.363 
Like the U.S., other common law countries have an RCO doctrine. As 
discussed above, the initial RCO cases in the U.S. followed English law. Under 
the laws of England, it is well-established that a person may be liable for 
authorizing or inducing a tort committed by another.364 English common law 
                                                 
355  BENEDETTO CONFORTI & FRANCESCO FRANCIONI, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN DOMESTIC COURTS (1997). 
356  Eric A. Engle, Tort Law and Human Rights, in COMPARATIVE TORT LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 70, 
at 73 (Mauro Bussani & Anthony J. Sebok eds., 2015); Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Access to Justice: 
Human Rights Abuses Involving Corporations — India, 17 (2011), https://perma.cc/8KGH-
BZLQ (Indian courts use international law principles when interpreting constitutional law). 
357  ICJ Report, supra note 353, at 13. 
358  CODE DE PROCEDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.], art. 2 (French victim of an international tort can obtain 
remedy in France). 
359  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by Order No. 83 of the President of the People's Republic of China, Mar. 14, 1997, 
effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 36, P.R.C. LAWS, https://perma.cc/ZT5U-2QLY (creating private 
claim for damages linked to criminal cause of action). 
360  ICJ Report, supra note 353, at 13 (citing INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 
TORT at 31). 
361  Id. at 16 (citing German Civil Code, laws of England Wales, and France, and Principles of European 
Tort law, www.egtl.org). 
362  Id. at 19 (citing The Principles of European Tort Law, https://perma.cc/RF9K-GUVC). 
363  Id. at 19–20. 
364  JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS 
AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 226 (2006). 
364  Id. at 146 & n. 870. 
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roots of the RCO doctrine go back to the nineteenth century.365 In 1846, in The 
Queen v. Woodrow, a tobacco dealer was charged with possession of adulterated 
tobacco. The court determined that with regard to “any matter that affected public 
health, persons could be required to act prudently in order to guard against injury 
to the public.”366 Australia applies RCO liability to environmental and health and 
safety legislation.367 
The U.K. also has civil nationality jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, torture, war crimes, residence of offender and territorial jurisdiction. In 
Chandler v. Cape PLC and Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC, the English high court 
ruled that a parent company’s Chief Executive Officer was in frequent contact 
with a local mine manager, so the parent company had the duty to take reasonable 
care to avoid foreseeable harm to the protestors.368 At English law, for offenses 
requiring criminal intent, corporate liability attributes through the identification 
principle, which requires that the natural person committing the offense is a 
director or otherwise entrusted with powers of company. 
Some countries have stepped into the void of confronting violations 
committed during their own past. In Argentina, business executives were sued for 
their responsibility for abduction, detention, and murder during the country’s 
“Dirty War” against dissidents between 1976 and 1983.369 In Argentina’s Civil 
Code, Articles 43 and 1113 together provide for liability of persons for damage 
caused by their dependents; dependents has been interpreted to include a 
company’s employees, agents, and other representatives who act under the 
instructions or direction of the company.370 The corporate veil is not a defense 
when corporate shares are used to breach the law, public order or good faith, or 
rights of third parties. In a case in Colombia against the Urapalma palm oil 
company, Colombian corporate officers were ordered to pay compensation to 
each victim of dislocation caused by their actions (the compensation accompanied 
prison sentences).371 
                                                 
365  Wise, supra note 322 (discussing The Queen v. Woodrow (1846) and Queen v. Stephens (1866)). 
366  Queen v. Woodrow, (1846) 153 Eng. Rep. 907, 912. 
367  See Karen Wheelwright, Australia, in DIRECTORS’ PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT 54 
(Helen Anderson ed., 2008); Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) § 144, 
https://perma.cc/7LCM-559R. 
368  Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC, [2010] EWHC 3228 (Q.B.) (Eng.). 
369  Payne & Pereira, supra note 80. 
370  Cod. Rev. art. 43, 1113 (Arg.). 
371  Leigh A. Payne & Gabriel Pereira, Corporate Complicity in International Human Rights Violations, 12 
ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI (2016). 
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Other important examples come from jurisdictions across the globe. 
German law provides criminal and civil jurisdiction for individual officers and 
executives.372 In two recent cases, the manager of a Danzer Group subsidiary was 
alleged to have used security forces in the Congo when he should have foreseen 
violence due to his role as a member of the governing board of the subsidiary and 
head of the African Management Team for the Danzer Group.373 Under German 
law, senior managers may have criminal responsibility arising from a duty of care 
toward those affected by the actions of their employees.374 In the Danzer case, the 
European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights ultimately filed a criminal 
complaint with the public prosecutor’s office that charged the Danzer Group 
senior manager with failure to issue clear directions. The complaint charged that 
the manager should have directed employees of the Siforco company (a Danzer 
subsidiary) that security forces must not be called in to deal with conflicts with the 
local population. The complaint stated that the call for security forces must be 
postponed until the results of any outgoing negotiations are clear; in addition, a 
precondition to the use of security forces is that those forces must agree that no 
human rights violations will be committed. The complaint further charged that 
security forces must only receive payments if they commit no human rights 
violations.375 
Japanese law could provide individual liability for gross human rights 
abuses.376 Article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code establishes tort liability and 
Article 715 provides for superior liability for a person who supervises the business 
or “employs others.”377 Dr. Jennifer Zerk found in 2014 that while no 
                                                 
372  BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] Jan. 2, 2002, § 831, ¶ 1, translation at 
https://perma.cc/P24U-FSY8 (Ger.) (“A person who uses another person to perform a task is 
liable to make compensation for the damage that the other unlawfully inflicts on a third party when 
carrying out the task. Liability in damages does not apply if the principal exercises reasonable care 
when selecting the person deployed . . . , or if the damage would have occurred even if this care 
had been exercised.”). 
373  See No Investigations Against Danzer Manager Over Human Rights Abuses Against Community in DRC, 
EUROPEAN CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS, https://perma.cc/P33M-X97N. 
374  German jurisprudence provides for the liability of leading employees of a company 
(Geschaftsherrenhaftung). 
375  Special Newsletter: Criminal Complaint against Senior Manager of Danzer: Accountability for Human Rights 
Violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, EUROPEAN CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL & HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Apr. 25, 2013), https://perma.cc/26CW-57UV; Peter Muchlinski & Virginie Rouas, 
Foreign Direct-Liability Litigation: Toward the Transnationalization of Corporate Legal Responsibility, in 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS: NEW EXPECTATIONS AND PARADIGMS 
357–91 (Lara Blecher et al. eds., 2014). 
376  Bussani & Infantino, supra note 56, at 14. 
377  MINPÕ [MINPÕ] [CIV. C.] arts. 709 (tort liability), and 715 (superior liability). [Companies Act], 
Companies Act, Part II, Chapter 4, Section 11 (Liability for Damages of Officer to Third Parties) 
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international law violations had been brought as torts, these violations could 
satisfy the Civil Code’s requirement of “illegality” or “infringement of rights.”378 
The Japanese Companies Act, Part III, Section 11 on Liability for Damages of 
Officers to Third Parties, provides that officers “with knowledge or grossly 
negligent in performing their duties” may be liable to a third party for resulting 
damages.379 
In a Korean case against Shinhan Bank directors, the court found that a chief 
executive officer has a duty to monitor380 the actions of subordinates.381 In order 
for corporate directors to be liable to third parties as provided in Article 401(1) of 
the Commercial Code, they must have neglected to perform their duties willfully 
or by gross negligence. If directors have neglected to perform their “duty to 
monitor” willfully or by gross negligence, they can be found liable for the damages 
incurred by a third party.382 The Indonesian Civil Code is similar, providing that a 
person is not only responsible for the damages caused by his own deed, but also 
for damages “caused by the acts of the individuals for whom he is responsible, or 
caused by matters which are under his supervision.”383 
In the Netherlands, a corporate director is liable if he “made a sufficiently 
serious mistake.”384 One example of an attempt to hold officers liable is in a case 
against the Trafigura company, which was domiciled in Netherlands and sued for 
the dumping of toxic waste off of the Ivory Coast that resulted in an estimated 
twelve deaths and thousands sickened; civil and criminal litigation was brought in 
the Ivory Coast, the Netherlands and the U.K.385 In 2012, the Amsterdam Court 
of Appeal ruled that Claude Dauphin, founder and director of the Dutch company 
Trafigura, could be prosecuted.386 In November of that year, the company publicly 
                                                 
(amended 2015), https://perma.cc/SF3F-XH8H). 
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384  Bastian F. Assink, Secondary Director Liability, THE DEFINING TENSION (Feb. 12, 2009), 
https://perma.cc/E9JU-8PFF. 
385  Nicola M.C.P. Jägers & Marie-José van der Heijden, Corporate Human Rights Violations: The Feasibility 
of Civil Recourse in The Netherlands, 33 BROOK J. INT’L L. 833 (2008); Case Profile: Trafigura Lawsuits, 
BUS. HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE, https://perma.cc/L8QM-CK6W. The ship’s captain and 
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Corporate Torts Green 
Winter 2017 515 
denied culpability but paid 1.3 million pounds in an out of court settlement in 
exchange for withdrawal of the charges against Dauphin.387 
Over the past several decades, a widening range of defendants have faced 
civil claims in human rights cases. Those defendants have included those who 
were complicit in, but did not physically commit, acts such as torture, war crimes, 
and genocide. The types of action include ordering the abuse, which is not 
challenged in its inclusion in the category of “direct” liability. Other types of 
“indirect” involvement include those who knew or had reason to know about the 
abuse but failed to take action to prevent or punish the violations. The examples 
from other national jurisdictions illustrate the underlying agreement in principle 
and the potential for greater use of superior corporate officer liability for human 
rights violations. 
VI.  DETERRENCE ,  PUNISHMENT ,  AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CORPORATE OFFICER RESPONSIBILITY AND 
CORPORATE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
This Section turns back to the questions that have been raised about the 
content and applicability of superior responsibility doctrines to corporate officers 
and addresses the value of this theory of liability. The purpose is to synthesize the 
elements identified in the multiple sources of law detailed above and concludes 
that there is a consensus on the liability of superior corporate officers in 
international and U.S. domestic law as well as other national jurisdictions. While 
there may be some variation in the mens rea element with regard to selected 
documents, the central question about enforcement of this standard is whether 
there is agreement on the duty of superior officers. Sources of law across 
international and national systems include duties for corporate superior officers 
to prevent and punish violations. Guidance from tort law further emphasizes the 
possibility of holding superior corporate officers liable. This standard is 
particularly relevant to human rights claims and serves an important function of 
providing remedies to human rights victims, punishing violators, and building a 
legal system that deters future violations. This Section returns to two of the 
normative concerns underlying the question of whether there is an enforceable 
standard for corporate officer superior responsibility: 1) what is the value of this 
type of liability, and 2) how does it relate to the liability for the corporate entity? 
International tribunals have commented on the efficacy of command 
responsibility: “Command responsibility is the most effective method by which 
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international criminal law can enforce responsible command.”388 In certain 
contexts, this applies to tort standards as well. 
International tribunals also have focused on due process considerations, and 
defense attorneys and scholars have addressed whether superior responsibility is 
a standard which is fair to the defendant and whether corporate officers are simply 
being made a scapegoat for widespread corporate policy.389 The multipronged 
focus on corporate accountability described above has included references to 
corporate officers, although the different forms of accountability for officers and 
the corporations themselves have not been systematically examined together. The 
focus on corporate liability has been on the entity itself; the liability of officers is 
sometimes assumed (the acts are carried out through the officers). Often, the 
focus of the liability is on the corporation because no individual officers are readily 
identifiable or each officer did not act alone and did not individually perform 
sufficient acts to render them liable. 
Corporate officer and corporate institutional liability may serve the similar 
purposes of compensating the victim, punishing the responsible party, and 
deterring future abuses. In some cases, both the officer and the corporation may 
be held liable for a tort. But there are also differences. At times, action may be 
collective,390 and the corporation itself must be the focus of liability for punitive 
actions to deter future violations; the company itself has breached its duty of 
care.391 When an officer is acting as the “alter ego” of the corporation and carrying 
out corporate policy, it is the corporation that bears responsibility (under the 
traditional theory of vicarious liability). On other occasions, individual officers 
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form shields individual officers and directors and other agents). 
Corporate Torts Green 
Winter 2017 517 
bear singular responsibility for abuses under their watch, and the most appropriate 
form of accountability and deterrence is to focus on the corporate officers. 
Holding the corporation accountable has been addressed as both an 
international and domestic obligation. Internationally, the role of the collective 
arises when particular human beings have not taken sufficient action for 
responsibility to be allocated to any particular individual,392 or where there is a 
responsibility on the corporation itself.393 There may be tactical reasons for actions 
against a corporation; some studies have shown that corporations are more likely 
to be held liable for negligent actions than are individuals.394 Further, activities of 
a corporate group may be closely integrated so that it may be difficult to pinpoint 
individual responsibilities and/or formal separation between functions and 
subdivisions should be disregarded and liability imposed on a parent company.395 
Corporate officer liability has a specific deterrent effect. In pursuing and 
accepting positions of leadership, corporate officers also assume positions of 
responsibility. Superior officers have an important vantage point and the authority 
to change conduct throughout an organization. This authority contains an 
affirmative duty to punish and prevent wrongs by subordinates.396 These actions 
serve both the individual harmed and, more widely, deter future wrongs against 
the community. 
When a particular officer has taken action that meets the standards for 
liability, that officer should be identified and his or her actions, or failure to fulfill 
a duty, should be held up to public scrutiny and held to account in the legal system. 
Corporate officers may be more worried about individual liability rather than the 
liability of the corporation itself; a common belief is that corporate liability is just 
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passed along to shareholders.397 Where the decisions may negatively impact 
individual corporate officers, the officers are more risk averse than when a 
decision affects third parties.398 Suits against individuals also have heavier litigation 
costs in terms of time and potential reputational harm than suits against corporate 
entities.399 
Allison Danner and Jenny Martinez have discussed the law and economics 
category of “least-cost avoiders” as applied to the criminal prosecution of superior 
officers—high-level officials are better placed to form policy and implement it.400 
Danner and Martinez also discuss the moral duties when a government or military 
official assumes command, arguing that these leaders “are not like everyone else” 
and “have affirmative obligations related to the governance of society, such as 
monitoring persons under their control to ensure that they comply with certain 
standards of conduct.”401 The same is true for corporate officers. 
Looking to psychological literature on group dynamics in general reveals that 
individuals acting in groups are more likely to accept hazardous risks than are 
individuals acting for themselves.402 A variable reducing risk-taking in groups is 
the presence of a powerful member of the group who is risk-averse.403 Holding a 
superior responsible for the actions of a subordinate could enhance the ability of 
a group to avoid hazardous risks; this follows the RCO doctrine developed in the 
U.K. and the U.S., and other tort regimes applying the precautionary principle. 
While a corporate officer has moral and legal duties to monitor subordinates 
and prevent and punish violations, a system should not be created or reinforced 
that allows certain individuals to be the sacrificial lambs for more widespread 
corporate behavior when the corporation as a whole that must be held 
accountable.404 The principle of vicarious liability holds that corporations are 
ultimately responsible for acts taken in the course of an officer’s corporate duties, 
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and many law and economics analyses find that limited liability is a more efficient 
means of allocating responsibility and costs.405 
Singling out individuals to hold them responsible is not a task to be 
undertaken lightly. A determination must be made about the control that the 
officer had over subordinates and whether the officer possessed the knowledge 
to allow prevention or punishment of the violation. The question of superior 
officer liability must first address the duty the officer has. In the context of a tort, 
there is also the question of foreseeability406 and the duty of reasonable care.407 
Tied into these questions is the question of notice—the standard must be 
consistent and clear so as to give notice to any potential offenders. As this Article 
has discussed, there is such a clear standard for superior responsibility for 
corporate officers. 
The standard of superior responsibility does not undercut corporate 
institutional liability. Together, these two forms of potential liability form 
important complementary pieces of a legal structure that can provide greater 
accountability for corporate violators and deter future violations. 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
This Article demonstrates that the important doctrine of superior 
responsibility is fully applicable to corporate officials, and can make an important 
contribution to corporate accountability for human rights violations. Holding 
corporate officials responsible under a theory of supervisory responsibility is 
common to human rights law, international criminal law, and domestic tort law, 
which suggests that it could serve as a more important tool for corporate 
accountability. The use of this doctrine on a more systematic basis could increase 
the efficacy of tort remedies as steps toward the goals of accountability, 
transparency, compensation for past abuses, and deterrence of ongoing or future 
human rights violations. 
Under international law and domestic law, corporate officers can and should 
be held liable for torts and related civil wrongs under a superior responsibility 
                                                 
405  See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for 
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standard. Using this form of accountability complements efforts to hold 
corporations themselves liable when they are complicit in human rights violations. 
Strengthening superior officer liability is a part of a robust and comprehensive 
legal regime to compensate victims of and prevent and punish human rights 
violations. Superior officer liability needs to be fully utilized for an effective legal 
system for the enforcement of international human rights law on corporate human 
rights violations. 
